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Executive Summary 
 
 
This research work addresses security-related issues in the electronic and mobile 
healthcare environments and proposes an appropriate security framework. The proposed 
framework will identify the necessary security technologies and measures needed to 
achieve and maintain the security of people, data and infrastructure of the healthcare 
environment. The study is made in the context of DITIS, a homecare telemedicine 
application.    
 
The framework uses the OCTAVE risk evaluation methodology to identify the risks and 
areas of concern that address security challenges that should be taken into consideration 
when implementing security. The security technologies and procedures proposed in the 
framework are categorized based on the security objective they serve i.e. confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, legal conformance. By categorizing technologies based on 
security objectives we aim in helping people identify the technology they need to 
implement, based on what they want to protect.  
 
The framework is extended to define a security-level information classification scheme 
that categorizes information based on its sensitivity (public, internal-use only, 
confidential, highly confidential). The classification is then associated with the 
appropriate security technologies that should be considered under each classification 
level. By associating security technologies with the information classification, the 
framework aims in balancing the trade-off between security complexity and 
performance of the system; it will provide guidelines for implementing the necessary 
measures and technologies, without complicating the operation of the system or 
saturating its performance with unnecessary functionality. 
 
Finally, an appropriate evaluation is applied on the proposed framework, as well as on 
DITIS which currently implements some aspects of the framework. Evaluation is 
essential to assess if the system’s security capabilities and procedures represent the 
security needs and requirements of the users that rely on the system to perform their job 
well. However, since it is not feasible to conduct a complete system-technical  
  
 
 
evaluation as DITIS has not reached its final operational state and security is still an on-
going activity, ISO/ IEC 17799 standard entitled Information technology - Security 
techniques - Code of practice for information security management has been selected to 
evaluate the proposed security framework. The standard provides best practice 
recommendations on information security management for use by those who are 
responsible for initiating, implementing or maintaining information security 
management systems; in general, it deals with the examination of non-technical issues 
related to personnel, procedural, physical security and security management. Therefore, 
it could be useful as a high-level evaluation of the proposed security framework, 
assessing the completeness of the framework against well-known practices. The result 
of the evaluation is expected to show if the proposed security framework implements 
adequate techniques and procedures providing the needed protection in the healthcare 
environment and identify the areas that need to address additional security measures. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
1.2 Thesis objectives 
1.3 Thesis outline 
1.1 Introduction 
Healthcare is associated with mission critical services that are connected with the well 
being of life. The recent technology and communication advances evolved the 
healthcare sector in a way that changed the traditional delivery of the healthcare 
services. Healthcare organizations worldwide benefit from the adoption and usage of 
electronic and mobile healthcare applications improving the access to medical 
information and the communication among the medical professionals, thus contributing 
to the quality of the provided care services. 
 
Electronic and mobile healthcare applications are essential for providing information 
such as Electronic Patient Records at the point of care, especially for meeting the needs 
of patients located away from a fully equipped hospital, and supporting the 
collaboration of healthcare professionals. Due to the critical nature of the healthcare 
environment and the sensitivity of the information involved, both the e-healthcare and 
m-healthcare services must be provided in a well secured and protected framework. 
 
The healthcare environment raises a number of considerations; privacy, confidentiality, 
integrity, legal and ethical considerations affect the intersection of technology and 
healthcare. Security becomes even more critical with the adoption of m-healthcare 
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systems, an environment rich with portable digital devices; physical threats, 
misplacement of devices, insecure wireless/ mobile links and compromization of 
sensitive data stored on wireless/ mobile devices are some of the challenges that need to 
be addressed. 
 
Although a number of e-healthcare and m-healthcare applications exist today with some 
form of security, the security challenges raised in this kind of environment, and the 
required security technologies, are not adequately addressed. Before moving into the 
implementation of various security solutions, it is of great importance to research and 
understand these security challenges and related security issues in order to develop a 
strong and robust security strategy. 
 
This research work is focused on investigating security-related issues in the electronic 
and mobile healthcare environments and proposing an appropriate security framework 
that will identify the necessary security technologies and measures needed to achieve 
and maintain the security of people, data and infrastructure of the healthcare 
environment. The study is made in the context of DITIS, a homecare telemedicine 
application. 
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1.2 Thesis objectives 
Electronic and Mobile Healthcare (e-Healthcare, m-Healthcare) applications process 
sensitive information that requires retaining its integrity and confidentiality at all times 
in order for the healthcare professionals to provide improved quality of care with the 
support of Information Technologies. The information stored and processed by these 
applications, like other important assets, has value to an organization and consequently 
needs to be suitably protected. Although most of the healthcare applications have 
implemented some kind of security, none is concerned with the security challenges 
raised in this environment. Usually, all people understand the significance of having a 
secure healthcare application but do not really investigate the reasons of such a need; 
instead they move quickly into implementation of various security techniques. 
However, it is significant to identify the fundamental need of security and define areas 
of concern that are vulnerable and need extra attention. By doing so, these areas will be 
taken into consideration when designing the security strategy of the organization that 
should include the appropriate measures to address the security issues involved in each 
area of concern. 
 
Once the areas of concern are identified, a suitable security framework will be proposed 
and analyzed, including all the appropriate security technologies and measures that are 
needed to safeguard the assets of the organization that operates the healthcare 
application. The security technologies and measures will be further categorized based 
on the security objective they serve (i.e. integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
availability) in order to emphasize their role in the information security and for people 
to know what they will protect when implementing a specific technology. 
 
Finally, the proposed security framework will be extended by defining a security-level 
information classification scheme that categorizes information based on its sensitivity 
(public, internal-use only, confidential, highly confidential). The classification is then 
associated with the appropriate security technologies that should be considered under 
each classification level. By associating security technologies with the information 
classification, the framework aims in balancing the trade-off between security 
 4 
complexity and performance of the system; it will provide guidelines for implementing 
the necessary measures and technologies, without complicating the operation of the 
system or saturating its performance with unnecessary functionality. 
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1.3 Thesis outline  
Chapter 1 introduces the reader into the study and sets thesis objectives. 
 
Chapter 2 defines the electronic and mobile healthcare environments, discusses related 
work, analyzes the security challenges that are raised and discusses the European 
legislative efforts towards healthcare security. 
 
Chapter 3 presents DITIS system and its environment and proposes a security 
healthcare framework. The framework: 
• Uses the OCTAVE risk evaluation methodology to identify the risks and areas of 
concern that address security challenges that should be taken into consideration 
when implementing security 
• Defines and categorizes security technologies based on the security objective 
they serve 
• Proposes a security-level information classification scheme that categorizes 
information based on its sensitivity (public, internal-use only, confidential, 
highly confidential) and it then associates it with the appropriate security 
technologies that should be considered under each classification level 
 
Chapter 4 assess the completeness of the proposed security framework based on ISO/ 
IEC 17799 standard entitled Information technology - Security techniques - Code of 
practice for information security management. 
 
Chapter 5 constitutes conclusions and future work.  
 
Chapter 6 lists the publications stemming from the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Security in Healthcare 
2.1 Healthcare environment 
2.2 Related work 
2.3 Security challenges 
2.4 European efforts  
2.1 Healthcare environment 
Healthcare services are provided using appropriate electronic and mobile applications 
that aid the medical professionals in their every day work to provide high-quality care 
services. These applications are used to access and process the Electronic Patient 
Records, independently of the medical professionals’ or the patients’ physical location. 
An appropriate infrastructure exists in order to support these healthcare applications, 
and could include personal computers, mobile and wireless devices, file and application 
servers, databases and fixed, mobile or/ and wireless networks. Usually, the 
communication between the device and the infrastructure is established using public 
networks, such as the Internet.   
 
Eysenbach defines e-healthcare as follows: 
 
“E-health is an emerging field in the intersection of medical informatics, public health 
and business, referring to health services and information delivered or enhanced 
through the Internet and related technologies. In a broader sense, the term 
characterizes not only a technical development, but also a state-of-mind, a way of 
thinking, an attitude, and a commitment for networked, global thinking, to improve 
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healthcare locally, regionally, and worldwide by using information and communication 
technology.” [1] 
 
e-Healthcare solutions [2] include products, systems and services that go beyond simply 
Internet-based applications. They include tools for health professionals as well as 
personalized health systems for patients and citizens. Examples include health 
information networks, sensor and body area healthcare networks, electronic health 
records, telemedicine and home care services, personal wearable and portable 
communicable systems, health portals, and many other information and communication 
technology-based tools assisting prevention, diagnosis, treatment, health monitoring, 
and lifestyle management. 
 
Although the development and usage of e-healthcare applications [16] changed the way 
the healthcare sector worked, the introduction of mobile healthcare systems [27] 
changed the healthcare environment even more and gave it a whole new meaning. The 
association of mobility in the healthcare environment is a powerful combination that 
gives the ability to doctors and medical staff to deliver high-quality services to patient 
located away from a fully equipped hospital. m-Healthcare [3,4] has been described as 
“the application of mobile computing technologies to provide mobile access to 
healthcare information systems.” m-Healthcare technologies enable access to important 
and useful information systems at the point of care, from remote locations, or from 
virtually any place within the healthcare facility using appropriate mobile devices such 
as pocket PCs, handheld PCs, mobile phones, tablet PCs etc; these devices 
communicate with a centralized information system to exchange data and provide 
services to medical professionals. 
 
Due to the critical nature of the healthcare environment, the operation of the appropriate 
healthcare applications must meet certain requirements [5,6] associated with the 
protection of medical records, systems and people involved; security becomes even 
more critical with the adoption of m-healthcare applications. Realizing the security 
issues involved is a complex and long-term process since healthcare systems are 
immensely complicated, both in terms of organization and technologies. All efforts 
should be concentrated on designing a comprehensive security strategy that will address 
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security issues and provide appropriate solutions to overcome security problems and 
risks. 
 9 
2.2 Related work 
There are a number of commercial projects that provide m-healthcare solutions, 
especially those that deal with Electronic Patient’s Records (EPR). However, none of 
them considers security as a whole, implementing a comprehensive security solution. 
Most commercial applications for EPR have been built upon the concept of using 
PDA’s as micro-computers running the healthcare software, and connecting to the 
central database over a wireless LAN connection.  
 
Patient Tracker [74] by HandHeldMed is a widely deployed patient charting application 
which allows mobile access to patient records and demographics among other reports. It 
uses simple password protection to protect patient records, and allows simple IR-based 
peer-to-peer transmission between Patient Tracker users. This ability to transmit 
records without being accountable to a central administration controlled security policy 
is an inherent flaw which can compromise the confidentiality of patient records.  
 
Wireless MediCenter [75] provides a highly efficient solution tailored for portable 
devices such as PDA’s and tablet PC’s. It is described by its creators as being “a 
wireless, paperless electronic medical record (EMR) system.” It uses read-write 
protection for access to the database where the EPR’s are stored, and can deliver them 
over a secure LAN or through high-speed wireless connections, as used by portable 
devices. It is a comprehensive solution to all doctor and patient needs and provides 
different portals for the patients to review their information. However, it does not use 
any notions of trust or digital credentials such as digital certificates which can make the 
entire application more secure, and also ease the workflow in the environment.  
 
The m-care [76] project aims at providing secure access to patient records and other 
data using a WAP based architecture in conjunction with a WAP-based mobile phone. It 
uses Wireless Transaction Layer Security (WTLS) to provide network security and 
personal PIN numbers to provide access to the system. A Microsoft SQL Server holds 
static information about users and their access rights to the EPR database, and a simple 
firewall software is used on the server to restrict connections to the service from the 
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WAP gateway. The use of PIN codes and static access control lists is not sufficient to 
deal with the accesses needed in a complex healthcare environment such as a hospital, 
though it may suffice for single individuals out in the field who can only access WAP 
services and cannot connect to the central database using a more secure wireless 
technology.  
 
Other custom solutions such as PatientKeeper [77] and PocketMD [78] attempt similar 
methods to the above in order to provide EPR’s on-the-go but have identical 
shortcomings to the other applications discussed here. 
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2.3 Security challenges 
Healthcare systems are comprised of 4 components: 
 
• People such as healthcare professionals (including administrative staff)  that use 
the system, developers that build the system, or patients 
• Infrastructure that involves equipment and networks 
• Electronic health records that are the central component of a healthcare system 
and which allow the sharing of medical information between care providers and 
patients 
• Tools to support healthcare professionals, as for example collaborative tools, 
calendars, demographics etc 
 
All the above components face a number of security challenges [7,14,17,18,24,25,27, 
51,68], including: 
 
• User authentication. Sensitive information such as the medical records must be 
accessed and processed only by those with a “need to know” basis. Otherwise, 
unauthorized people could reveal confidential information and cause problems 
to the patients and their reputation.  
• Data integrity. Medical professionals are depended on the accuracy of the 
medical data to provide reliable services and treat patients. Otherwise, human 
life may be at danger. Information should be protected by unauthorized 
alterations. 
• Network security. Healthcare systems exchange sensitive information over 
public networks such as the internet. It is crucial to avoid interception of 
information over the network since this could lead to modification or even 
disclosure of medical information.  
• Availability. Healthcare incidents could be caused any time during the day. 
Thus, the medical professionals need to be able to access the medical data of 
the patient to provide him the appropriate treatment. This means that the 
systems and data must be available on a 24/7 basis.  
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• Accuracy of healthcare data. By introducing a paperless healthcare system, 
new challenges are raised opposed to the traditional paper system, one of which 
is the accuracy of the healthcare data. The human factor is responsible for 
entering healthcare data of a patient in the system and (unintentional) mistakes 
could happen when providing such data as drug descriptions. If this happens, 
then the patient is in danger due to erroneous data that could be used for his 
treatment.  
• Quality of Service. Medical professionals are interested for providing the best 
care at the minimum time. They need to quickly access the healthcare system 
and perform their job easily and efficiently. This requirement many times is 
prohibited due to the complexity of the security technologies implemented. The 
challenge here is to balance efficiency with the trade-off of security.  
• Physical security of data and systems. Although communication is made 
electronically, most of the times we overlook the obvious problems. Physical 
security of systems and data involves issues relating to the physical access to 
hardware systems and data, theft prevention, backup and disaster recovery, and 
the security of sensitive devices such as mobile terminals.  
• Legal and liability issues. The storage and processing of healthcare information 
must be performed according to appropriate European and national legislation 
since it is vital for both the patients and the care providers to be legally covered; 
the former have the right for privacy while the latter must be protected in cases 
they performed their job as expected. Additional challenges are raised 
concerning liability issues. Healthcare systems must be in position to identify 
professionals that made a change on the data or took an action and take 
responsibility of this, if required. 
• Ethics. Care providers must be governed by professionalism and operate within 
the medical confidentiality oath. They must be aware and acknowledge the 
importance of safeguarding medical data in order to provide quality healthcare 
services. 
• Education of users. Both the patients and the medical professionals must be 
informed about their rights and educated appropriately. Patients must get 
informed about the legislation that protects their right to privacy while medical 
professionals must be educated about the correct and safe usage of the system 
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as well for the appropriate procedures they must follow. Education is vital in 
order to build trust and confidence among people that either rely on the system 
to provide their services or receive services based on data stored on it. 
• Mobility. Special security considerations and challenges are raised when 
mobility is introduced in the healthcare environment; presence of foreign users, 
very large number of users and resources, difficulty in maintaining central 
control, and communication over insecure wireless links. Furthermore, due to 
their small size, handheld devices may be misplaced, left unattended, or stolen; 
user authentication may be disabled, a common default mode, revealing the 
contents of the device to anyone who possesses it; even if user authentication is 
enabled, the authentication mechanism may be weak or easily circumvented; 
the ease with which handheld devices can be interconnected wirelessly, 
combined with weak or no authentication of the parties involved, provides new 
avenues for the introduction of viruses or other types of malicious code, and 
also other forms of attack such as a man-in-the-middle attack. In addition, 
limitations of mobile devices (limited battery life, computational power) often 
affect the adoption of security technologies. 
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2.4 European efforts  
Use of information technology offers great potential for patients, professionals and for 
health systems overall. Health-related information is already one of the most searched-
for topics on the internet, as citizens look to be better informed about their health and 
decisions affecting it. Data privacy and security in e-healthcare have a European 
dimension [8, 15]. The Commission is taking forward actions [9] to promote secure e-
healthcare as part of the European e-health action plan. 
 
The confidentiality and protection of patient data is governed by the general European 
Union rules of data protection and privacy of electronic communications. 
 
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [10] addresses the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
The objective of this Directive is to harmonize data protection legislation in the Member 
States, in order to facilitate the free movement of personal data within the Union while 
protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons. The Directive 
contains a general prohibition on processing sensitive data, including data concerning 
health, but with a limited number of exceptions. In particular, the general prohibition on 
processing sensitive data may be lifted if the subject of the data gives their explicit 
consent, provided that the laws of the Member State concerned allow individuals to give 
such consent. Health data may also be processed in situations where this is required for 
the purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or 
treatment or the management of health care services, and where those data are processed 
by a health professional who is subject to the obligation of medical confidentiality or by 
another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy. Although the 
directive provides a framework for handling personal data and health data in cross-
border care, awareness of these provisions may not be sufficient in the health sector. If 
they are not applied, this may mean that the privacy of citizens is not properly respected 
– or conversely, that relevant information for their care does not follow patients when 
they seek care elsewhere within the Union. The Commission will work with the 
Member States and with the national data protection authorities to raise awareness of 
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these provisions as they apply to healthcare and to address any outstanding issues if 
needed. 
 
The Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and Electronic Communications [11] harmonizes 
the provisions of the Member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect 
to the processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector, regardless of 
the technologies used and to ensure the free movement of such data and of electronic 
communication equipment and services in the Community. The provider of a publicly 
available e-healthcare service must take appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to safeguard security of its services, if necessary in conjunction with the 
provider of the public communications network with respect to network security. 
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, these measures 
shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk presented. In case of a particular 
risk of a breach of the security of the network, the provider of the e-healthcare service 
must inform the subscribers concerning such risk and, where the risk lies outside the 
scope of the measures to be taken by the service provider, of any possible remedies, 
including an indication of the likely costs involved. 
 
The Electronic Commerce Directive 99/93/EC [12] which creates a legal framework for 
the provision of information society services, also applies to the provision of online 
health services. The Directive, principally by virtue of its internal market clause, 
contributes to the legal certainty and clarity needed for the provision of online 
information society services throughout the entire Community. In particular, its 
provisions on information and transparency requirements, commercial communications, 
the liability of intermediary service providers, and the basic principles it establishes 
regarding electronic contracts, provide for high standards in the provision of online 
services in all Member States, thus also increasing consumer confidence. 
 
The Electronic Signatures Directive 93/93/EC [13] defines that electronic signatures 
have the legal equality with hand-written signatures and creates the legal and technical 
framework that verifies the uniqueness and origin of the electronic signatures. The 
authenticity and integrity of the electronic documents in the healthcare environment are 
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of great importance. A signature is the expression of approval of the author with the 
content of a writing to which he consents and accepts the legal consequences. In order 
to attach legal effect to a signature one has to ascertain its origin. The signature is 
unique. Indeed the identification of the signature guarantees the non-repudiation of the 
will of the person behind the signature. The author of the signature must be the one who 
is committed. The need to identify a person unambiguously is a most important 
component of the interoperability of health information systems. The development of 
the electronic transfer of documents requires the legally acceptance of electronic 
signature. The electronic signature directive is therefore a necessary tool for the 
electronic medical prescription. By means of an electronic qualified signature, the 
medical doctor may electronically send a secure and certified medical prescription to the 
pharmacist. By means of the electronic signature the patient may also correspond 
individually and safely with the online pharmacist. 
 
Another important legal issue is liability in the event of problems - such as technical 
malfunctions of the system, network, or provision of the service itself - that result in 
serious harm to a patient. While there are currently no specific guidelines or liability 
rules, as with any emerging or growing area of practice, only the increased use of e-
Health applications and the performance of e-Healthcare will make its potential fully 
visible as well as raising any remaining legal uncertainties. 
 
Further steps might be considered if they could show that even greater legal certainty 
would reinforce patient confidence in e-Health services. Similar safeguards for 
qualifications might also be useful. Building trust is a prerequisite to the development of 
an information society, in e-Health probably more than anywhere else. Citizens prefer 
services and information tailored to their needs and requirements, while knowing that 
their right to privacy is protected. The Commission advocates that it will work with the 
Member States through appropriate Healthcare groups to raise awareness of these 
provisions and to address any outstanding issues. 
 
 
 
 17 
Chapter 3 
Security Framework 
3.1 DITIS Case study  
3.2 Security analysis  
3.3 Security framework 
3.4 Security based on Information Classification  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates security-related issues in the healthcare environment and 
proposes a security healthcare framework. The study is made in the context of DITIS 
healthcare application, involving: 
 
• Adoption of the OCTAVE risk evaluation methodology to identify the risks and 
areas of concern that address security challenges that should be taken into 
consideration when implementing security 
• Definition and categorization of security technologies based on the security 
objective they serve 
• Definition of a security-level information classification scheme that categorizes 
information based on its sensitivity (public, internal-use only, confidential, 
highly confidential) and it then associates it with the appropriate security 
technologies that should be considered under each classification level 
• Implementation of the security framework in DITIS 
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3.2 DITIS Case study 
The healthcare application and its infrastructure considered for this research are used to 
drive the security analysis that derives the areas of concern that will be taken into 
consideration when designing the security strategy. This section defines DITIS 
environment, its main services and functionality that are considered for the study. 
3.2.1 Environment 
DITIS [19,20] (in Greek it stands for Networked Collaboration for Home healthcare) is 
an Internet-based Group collaboration system with fixed and GSM/GPRS mobile 
connectivity. 
 
DITIS was initiated in 1999, supporting the activities of the home healthcare service of 
the Cyprus Association of Cancer Patients and Friends (PASYKAF). DITIS supports 
homecare by offering wireless healthcare services for chronic illnesses with emphasis 
on prevention, assessment and diagnosis. The main service is the dynamic creation, 
management and co-ordination of Virtual Collaborative Healthcare Teams for the 
continuous treatment of a patient at home, independently of physical location of the 
team’s members, or the patient. For each patient a flexible (dynamic) virtual medical 
team is provided, made up from visiting homecare nurses, doctors, and other healthcare 
professionals, responsible for each case that may not be physically located at the same 
time at a particular patient. The team has easy and timely access to the unified 
Electronic Medical Record database to retrieve information about a patient i.e. the 
current medical treatment and modify it as needed, as well as a range of collaboration 
tools and services. Currently, the main mobile device used within DITIS application is 
Sony Ericsson P900 mobile phone. 
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Figure 3.1: DITIS architecture 
3.2.2 Stakeholders 
Currently, DITIS application is used by the following categories of people: 
 
• Healthcare professionals (i.e. oncologists, cardiologists) 
• Nurses 
• Therapists (i.e. physiotherapists, social workers) 
• Secretarial personnel 
 
All people aforementioned are working for the welfare of the patients. 
3.2.3 Functionality 
The main services that are provided through DITIS application are the following: 
 
• Demographics 
• Medical history 
• Symptoms registry 
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• Diagnosis 
• Treatment 
• Medication 
• Virtual Team registry 
• Statistics 
• Appointments 
 
Following is a plausible scenario illustrating aspects of DITIS functionality. 
 
Nurse Mary wakes up early in the morning. After showering and a quick breakfast she 
connects (with her Mobile Computing Unit, MCU, such as a Smart Phone, Pocket PC 
etc…) to the central office web server to check in and acquire her day’s visit schedule 
(the nurse does not have to physically check in). Her schedule includes a number of 
visits. For each patient to visit, Mary downloads on her MCU the needed information, 
plans her route, and updates the Web server of her schedule.  
 
At first she visits Mr. P., a nice sweet old man who while enjoying the comfort and love 
of his home he regularly requires (and receives) attention due to the seriousness of his 
situation. Arriving at his house and examining Mr. P. nurse Mary realizes an extreme 
change in his condition. She immediately (via GSM/GPRS) connects with the web 
server and via the MCU’s application interface reports the incident. The system records 
(into the electronic medical record of the patient in the database) the new data, and 
based on the identified/pre-wired scenario triggers and transmits messages to the other 
members of the team alerting them and requesting their services.  
 
For each member of the team DITIS extracts from the EMR only the needed (and 
authorized) parts of the information, prepares it and then forwards to them. That is the 
MCU device of every team member is receiving not only the data of the triggering 
incident (i.e., patient P. experiences extreme pain in the lower back) but also relevant 
patient history. (The virtual team around patient P. has now been set in motion in 
seconds defying distance and geographical barriers.)  
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The responsible doctor, Dr. A., studies the information submitted to her and prescribes 
the health care protocol which nurse Mary and other team members (e.g. a prescribed 
physiotherapy) should administer. Also a new appointment is scheduled for patient P. 
with the oncologist. Nurse Mary performs her tasks and Mr. P. returns back to his 
smiley and happy self; the virtual medical team made the ‘miracle’. His family is 
thanking nurse Mary who is headed to her next appointment. She is checking her 
schedule when a message comes in informing her that Mrs. D., her next patient, has 
suffered an extreme crisis and she has been taken to the hospital. Nurse Mary, while 
sorry for Mrs. D., is headed to the next patient in her list, Mr. X. Nurse Mary examines 
patient X. and updates the database accordingly. And so the day goes on. 
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3.3 Security analysis 
A number of security solutions exist today to protect information, systems and people. 
However, technology is useful only when used properly; depending on the security 
needs and requirements present at each situation, appropriate technology must be 
addressed. In DITIS system, it was a high priority to investigate and address the security 
issues related to DITIS environment such as privacy, confidentiality, integrity, legal and 
other security-related considerations. By doing so, possible threats and risks could be 
addressed and appropriate security solutions could be applied. 
 
This section emphasises the need to identify appropriate security areas of focus [66] 
based on the nature of the application / environment under consideration and its security 
needs. The target is to identify vulnerable areas that need special attention before 
moving into implementation. In this way, the development team will be able to address 
and implement appropriate security technology providing an enhanced level of 
protection to each area. After the areas of focus are identified, an appropriate study will 
be made resulting in a proposed security strategy that will address the areas that are 
listed within the current study. 
 
Following, the security analysis applied on DITIS is presented in detail.  
3.3.1 Risk evaluation 
It is a common acceptance that most of times people involved in software development 
place their focus on the implementation of the requirements rather than solving security 
issues. However, security is not an issue that can be overlooked since security incidents 
are reported every day, some of which may cause great damage to an organization. 
Therefore, it is crucial to design a comprehensive security approach in order to face 
security problems.  
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The initial step of a strong security approach should be the risk analysis and evaluation 
process [26]. Risk analysis involves identifying assets that need protection and 
evaluating possible threats against these assets. Specifically, it is a process that ensures 
that the security controls of a system are fully commensurate with its risks. The value of 
performing a risk analysis is that it helps out developers to focus their attention on the 
possible threats their application and assets are facing by having a better understanding 
of the environment; after all, before someone can protect something he has to know that 
it is at risk. Beyond the improved awareness risk analysis may raise, it also helps in 
improving the basis for decision; based on the risks and security needs the right 
decisions could be made to adopt appropriate security technology without affecting user 
and system performance. Furthermore, risk analysis could justify security costs since it 
helps identifying security mechanisms that are worth the expense. 
 
There are different approaches toward risk analysis, one of which is OCTAVE 
(Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation). OCTAVE 
[21,22,23] is a risk based strategic assessment and planning technique for security. By 
using the OCTAVE approach, the organization can make decisions regarding 
information security countermeasures that preserve the Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability model of critical information-related assets. All aspects of risk (assets, 
threats, vulnerabilities, and organizational impact) are evaluated and factored into 
decision making, enabling an organization to match a practice-based protection strategy 
to its security risks. 
 
The OCTAVE method uses a three-phase approach to examine organizational and 
technology issues leading to a clear view of the security needs. In phase 1, critical assets 
are identified and threats against these assets are reported. Phase 2 is an evaluation of 
the information infrastructure identifying vulnerabilities that can lead to a security 
incident related with the critical assets. Phase 3 identifies the impact of threats to critical 
assets, develops criteria to evaluate the risks and finally creates a protection strategy.  
 
As mentioned earlier, DITIS is a telemedicine system used by PA.SY.KA.F, a small-to-
medium organization. Since OCTAVE is focused on large-scale organizations, it was 
appropriately adopted to meet the size and target of the organization. However, the main 
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context of the model was maintained throughout the case study. Feedback for each 
phase was gathered through a combination of techniques; questionnaires and interviews 
were used to gather the healthcare team’s considerations towards security issues and 
protection of medical records, document review such as system documentation 
(manuals, documented vulnerabilities), similar case studies, legislative documentation, 
and usage of automated scanning tools were used to evaluate the architecture’s 
components and provide information for designing a strong security strategy.   
 
Following, the phases used to apply the OCTAVE risk model are presented. 
3.3.1.1 Identification of assets 
The first step of a risk analysis is to identify the assets of the company. The assets can 
be collected into categories i.e. hardware, software, data, people, documentation. This 
listing is essential in order to know what we are trying to protect and in what degree.  
 
After evaluating DITIS architecture and operational procedures, critical assets have 
been identified. With respect to: 
 
• Hardware, personal computers, mobile devices (i.e. tablet pcs, mobile phones, 
personal digital assistants), web servers and database servers are listed. The 
healthcare team uses mobile devices and personal computers to access the 
Electronic Medical Record and retrieve information about a patient, at the time 
of need. Web and database servers are part of the architecture that support web 
accessing and storing of medical records, respectively.    
• Information, electronically stored medical records are listed as the number one 
critical asset of the organization. Medical records are accessed by mobile 
devices to provide quality and efficiency in the provided homecare services. 
Information asset also includes software coding and documentation.   
• Software, the application is listed. The healthcare team depends on the 
functionality of the application to perform well in their job.  
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• People, expertise is listed. The development team of DITIS includes 
professionals working in areas such as database / web / mobile programming, 
security, analysis and design and system modeling. Since up to two persons are 
involved in each area, absence of a member of the team for any reason (i.e. quit, 
vacation) could cause huge problems. Furthermore, the healthcare team of 
DITIS includes a number of healthcare professionals (i.e. oncologists, nurses, 
physiotherapists), some of which have expertise in using computing systems and 
some others have minimum computer skills. 
 
Identification of the critical assets of the organization will drive all future actions of risk 
analysis. Therefore, it is essential to produce a comprehensive listing of all critical 
assets that could be in danger in the case of a security breach and need to be protected. 
3.3.1.2 Identification of threats 
The next step of risk analysis, based on the profile of the organization, is to determine 
the threats [28,29] that may cause damage to the assets of the organization. By 
identifying the threats a strong level of protection could be applied to defeat any threat 
that may put the organization at risk. 
 
Based on DITIS profile and taking into consideration the fact that DITIS is a mobile 
telemedicine application, security goals that must be met are set to: 
 
• Confidentiality. Confidentiality ensures that sensitive information is available 
only to those who are authorized to access it. Since information is related to 
sensitive personal information such as medical records, Data Protection Law 
restrictions should be followed. Furthermore, the network architecture and 
sensitive configurations must be kept secret from people without the need to 
know.   
• Integrity. Integrity protects systems and information from unexpected 
modifications. Medical records must be kept accurate and be modified by 
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authorized personnel. System configurations must be up to date and modified by 
authorized members of the development team to preserve the stability of the 
system. 
• Availability. Information and systems should be accessible at any requested 
time. Due to the nature and criticality of the healthcare sector, medical records 
and systems must be available on a 24/7 basis to nurse patients quickly and 
effectively at any time needed. 
• Authentication & Authorization. A&A are two related concepts. Authentication 
provides a way to proof identify of a user and authorization determines whether 
an authenticated user has the credentials to carry out a certain activity. 
Healthcare and development team members should be assigned special 
credentials to access the system and information stored on them. Proper security 
education should be provided to prevent people from exchanging passwords or 
performing other actions that could endanger the safety of people, information 
and systems. 
• Access control. Access control protects the system and resources against 
unauthorized usage. Different access control mechanisms should be provided to 
safeguard different levels of sensitivity. For example first level access control 
should be implemented for information shared between the healthcare team 
while second (or more) access controls should be applied for information 
designated for a group of users i.e. nurses, social workers, physiotherapists. 
• Accountability. Actions taken by legitimate users can be tracked down. By 
doing so, a user is accountable for his actions. Mechanisms should be in place to 
protect people from been accused for something they did not do. In addition to 
this, appropriate legislation must be in place to legally cover innocent people.  
• Physical security. Since the study is focused on mobile healthcare applications, 
physical security of the mobile devices is a critical objective that must be 
achieved in order to protect sensitive information that is stored locally on the 
devices. Mobile devices can be easily misplaced or lost. Therefore, appropriate 
techniques must be applied to maintain security even though a mobile device is 
stolen. 
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The following table presents the threats found against the critical assets of the company 
and the security goals identified. 
 
Table 3.1: Identification of Threats 
 
After studying the threats that could endanger the safety of the organization, DITIS 
team identified potential threat-sources that could initiate a threat. Three categories of 
threat-source were identified: 
 
• Non-malicious employees. People within the organization who accidentally 
cause damage to computer systems and information due to lack of security 
education or negligence.  
• Malicious employees. People within the organization who deliberately misuse 
systems and information i.e. terminated or disgruntled employees. 
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• Attackers. People who attack computer systems to cause damage i.e. disclosure 
of information, illegal modifications, exploitation. 
 
These categories will be taken into consideration when designing the security strategy. 
Appropriate mechanisms should be implemented to act proactively against potential 
security threats.  
 
Beyond the identification of operational and technological threats, DITIS development 
team evaluated the components of the infrastructure along the recommendations 
provided from vendors and run vulnerability evaluation tools against key components. 
The target was to identify technology vulnerabilities associated with each component 
that could lead to unauthorized access to the system causing great damage, and apply 
the necessary measures to prevent it. Listing vulnerabilities of key components is out of 
the scope of this study since they are related with specific vendor technology that may 
not be applicable in other situations. 
3.3.1.3 Identification of impact 
This section defines impact descriptions for threat outcomes (disclosure, modification, 
loss, destruction, interruption of critical asset). The impact description is a narrative 
statement that describes how a threat ultimately affects the organization's mission. 
 
• Disclosure: Failure to safeguard privacy would result in loss of credibility of the 
organization. This will lead to bad publicity. Reputation of patients may be 
damaged, for example they could loose their job. Patients will not give their 
consent to store personal information electronically or even they will seek care 
from another source. Healthcare team will stop using the system and return to 
paper workflow. 
• Modification: Provision of healthcare services may be affected and not delivered 
correctly since malicious modifications could affect appointments, medical 
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treatment and productivity. Patients’ health could be affected due to improper 
changes to medical records. 
• Loss / Destruction: Information is impossible to reconstruct or it can be 
reconstructed partially or totally. Trying to verify and reenter what was lost 
between the last backup and the present would consume a lot of time and 
resources. 
• Interruption: The healthcare team cannot deliver its services effectively. The 
system and information stored on them are not available at a requested time.   
 
Each threat is related to a potential impact on the critical assets of the company. The 
scope of this step is create threat profiles by establishing a link among assets, threats, 
and impacts, providing a basis on which the risks can be analyzed and calculated. 
The following figure shows the threat profile associated with medical records identified 
by DITIS team. As the figure shows, medical records are endangered by malicious code 
that could cause modifications to information, disclose sensitive data and interrupt the 
services provided by the application; telecommunication problems could lead to 
extended interruption of provided services if the problem is not recovered immediately; 
weak authentication procedures could allow users to guess passwords of legitimate 
users which they then use to gain unauthorized access to the system and destroy, modify 
or disclosure information for their own illegal purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Identification of impact 
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3.3.1.4 Create risk evaluation criteria 
Evaluation criteria are measures against which the impacts identified previously are 
evaluated. The evaluation criteria define the organization’s tolerance for risk for a 
certain impact. Before conducting an evaluation, a set of impact areas are identified 
which they constitute critical areas that if affected could cause great damage to the 
organization and people involved. DITIS team identified the following impact areas 
based on the nature and objectives of the organization:  
 
• Organization’s Reputation. Above all, if the patients do not trust the 
organization for providing effective and quality of services, they will move to 
other organizations. This could lead to the closing down of the organization.   
• Patient’s confidence. If the patients do not place their trust to the system 
anymore due to a severe security breach and do not consent in storing their 
sensitive medical information electronically, then the system gets ineffective and 
quality of provided services is degraded.     
• Healthcare team’s confidence. The system success depends on the full adoption 
and usage by the members of the healthcare team. If they fear technology or they 
are not convinced that medical records are well protected, then they will not use 
the system but rather they will provide services based on the traditional paper 
workflow. 
• Productivity. If a security breach is successful, this could decrease productivity. 
The healthcare team may need to spend more effort and time to provide services 
which normally need fewer resources to be delivered successfully. 
• Life continuity. Number one consideration of the healthcare team is the health of 
its patients. Any security breach that could lead to loss of life must be prevented. 
The healthcare team must be reassuranced that this would be the case.   
• Legal Penalties. A number of laws exist today to protect the sensitive 
information of citizens such as medical records and religious beliefs from 
disclosure. The organization and its members must act accordingly to the 
guidelines of the law, otherwise they could be found responsible of causing 
damage and face penalties defined by the law. 
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The following table defines a three-scale measurement (low, medium and high), each 
having its own evaluation criteria against each area of impact.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Risk Evaluation Criteria 
3.3.1.5 Calculation of risk-impact 
Finally, the risk analysis ends up by calculating the magnitude of impact towards the 
evaluation criteria by assigning the impact description a value: high, medium, or low. 
 
The following table shows the magnitude of damage / loss that could result due to a 
number of threats launched against medical records maintained by the system. By 
defining the magnitude of impact, the organization can identify the main threats and 
prioritize them in a way to help design and implement the appropriate security 
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technologies overcoming possible security breaches. For example, interruption of 
provided services due to telecommunication problems has a low impact on the 
organization because it cannot endanger the information included in the medical 
records. However, if the impact was defined on the quality of the provided healthcare 
service it would have a medium to high affect depended on the time required to recover 
the connection with the system; many times, the quality of the healthcare services 
depends on how quickly a user can access the system and retrieve the medical record of 
a patient, especially when there is a healthcare incident.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Calculation of risk - impact 
3.3.2 Areas of concern 
 As mentioned earlier, the risk analysis methodology was applied to determine areas 
that are vulnerable and need extra attention to prevent security violations. After 
studying the results of the risk analysis, the following areas were identified, and which 
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must be taken into consideration when designing the security strategy of the 
organization: 
 
• Security awareness. The study revealed lack of adoption of security practices 
such as using strong passwords and applying antivirus on downloaded 
documents. Many times ignorance could cause the same damage as an 
intentional illegal action. Before trying to secure the organization from 
outsiders, appropriate measures should be taken to safeguard assets from 
security unaware employees. 
• Access control. The healthcare team of DITIS includes a number of 
professionals; oncologists who are based in the oncology center, treating doctors 
who are usually located in the community, homecare nurses who visit the patient 
regularly at home, and a number of other professionals called in as the demand 
arises, typically physiotherapists, psychologists, and social workers. Each group 
of users handles different data about a patient related to his / her job function. 
There is the need to assign different permissions to each group of users 
providing an appropriate view of the Electronic Medical Record. In addition to 
this, access control mechanisms should be strong enough to prevent an attacker 
who stole a mobile device to access information stored on it. 
• Ethics & Legislation. The healthcare team is bound by the medical 
confidentiality and its first priority is to respect the patient’s right for privacy as 
identified by the law. However, not all people involved in the organization are 
bound by the medical confidentiality i.e. a secretary. Appropriate mechanisms 
should be implemented to prevent people outside the medical confidentiality to 
access confidential information. Furthermore, nurses fear taking responsibility 
for an action that was taken by someone else, for example change the medical 
treatment of a patient. However, although the nurses are responsible for the 
provided treatment in accordance to the prescribed protocol, they are not 
responsible for its selection. Further mechanisms should be in place to track 
users’ action and prevent situations like the one described. Generally, if anyone 
(including the healthcare members) is found compromising confidentiality must 
face appropriate penalties set by the organization and the law.  
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• Transparency. The patients have the right to be informed when their personal 
data is stored and processed electronically as defined by the law. The healthcare 
team is obligated to inform the patients that they use their personal information 
to provide their services and also ensure that the patient can access his 
information and correct inaccurate data. In addition, the healthcare team feels 
that it is important to have the written consent of the patients to store and 
process their personal data so that they are legally covered in a lawsuit. 
• Quality of services. The scope of developing any e-healthcare application is to 
provide quality of services. Considerations are raised towards usability and a 
number of security requirements. Since mobile devices are constrained by a 
limited screen, available security services must be easy to use and designed 
having in mind usability concepts. Regarding the security requirements: loss of 
availability can cause severe damage; nurses fear situations where a patient may 
need immediately care and they could not access his medical record in order to 
find his medical treatment and act accordingly. Loss of integrity is unacceptable 
since it would affect the provided care services. Mechanisms to safeguard that 
information is traveling from one end to the other without being intercepted and 
modified in the process should be implemented. Furthermore, quality of 
healthcare services is dependant on an effective security management. A 
structured administration is needed to immediately respond to problems. The 
team must feel the presence of a person that will help them with the system if 
they have a problem. Placing confidence to the system is not an easy task to do 
as some members of the team have until recently been working with the 
traditional paper workflow. Therefore, the need of having a structured 
administration is a must. 
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3.4 Security framework 
This section presents a proposed security framework for healthcare applications, 
initiated by OCTAVE risk assessment methodology. The areas of concern identified 
previously, leads to the design and implementation of a multi-layer security architecture 
to provide strong protection to the system, data and people involved. The architecture 
consists of the necessary security mechanisms and technology that are needed to 
safeguard the electronic healthcare environment. Each security mechanism that is 
proposed is briefly described. The security framework is implemented in DITIS; some 
of the technologies are still under development in DITIS environment.  
 
The objective of the proposed security framework is to establish appropriate security 
procedures and technologies [8,14,30-38,44,45,53,65,68,69,73] to protect sensitive 
information and systems from the following: 
 
• Interception of data transmission 
• Unauthorized access 
• Network attacks 
• Lost devices 
 
These issues are found during the communication between: 
 
• The healthcare service provider and the device. This is the initial point in the 
process of a transaction. This stage implicitly assumes that the person originating 
a transaction is the device owner and is an authorized user. Unfortunately, this 
leads to an uncomfortable assumption that the possessor of the device is indeed 
an authorized healthcare user and the owner of the device. To ensure end-to-end 
security, a number of issues must be resolved: can a transaction be prevented if 
an unauthorized person tries to masquerade as a legitimate user and engages in a 
transaction? If an unauthorized transaction occurs, is the provider who has the 
true ownership of the device liable? Also, what is the liability of the organization 
if an unauthorized person successfully completes a healthcare transaction leading 
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to undesirable consequences for one or more patients? Conversely, if the mobile 
device is stolen, can a transaction be prevented? 
• The device and the ISP operator. This stage of a transaction occurs over the open 
air when using mobile devices. Typically, the user’s directive is transmitted from 
his mobile device to a base station. Since the data transmission is wireless, there 
is a possibility of intercepting the radio transmission. If an adversary can 
intercept a transmission, not only there is loss of confidentiality but also other 
potential consequences. For example, the adversary may be able to gain access 
to confidential information about a patient and maliciously change medical 
directive leading to severe damage or even to loss of life. 
 
The proposed security mechanisms included in the framework are categorized based on 
the security requirements they fulfil. This categorization is deemed necessary for having 
a clear view of what each technology is used for and what it can protect. In this way, a 
mechanism is chosen to supplement the others in an attempt to create a comprehensive 
and strong security strategy. 
3.4.1 Authentication 
Authentication is the process of recognizing and verifying valid users, processes or 
devices, and ensures that only legitimate users may access systems and information 
stored on them. A combination of authentication mechanisms should be implemented 
according to the security level defined. 
 
There are three main ways to authenticate an identity: 
 
1. Something you know, like a password or pass phrase 
2. Something you have, like a token 
3. Something you are, a measurable trait 
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These are often referred to as the three pillars of authentication. They can be used 
separately or combined for even stronger authentication. 
3.4.1.1 PIN / Password 
Mobile device users must be able to authenticate themselves to the mobile device by 
providing a Personal Identification Number - PIN (i.e. for mobile phones), a password 
(i.e. for PDAs), or both. Passwords have been successfully providing security for 
computer systems for a long time. They are integrated into many operating systems, and 
users and system administrators are familiar with them.   
 
Attention is needed when choosing weak PINs or passwords since they could easily be 
compromised and give access to an adversary that would masquerade as a legitimate 
user. At the most basic level, organizations should require the selection of strong 
passwords that would be difficult to guess. Ofcourse, complex passwords introduce new 
problems; if they are hard to remember people would be tempted to write them down 
with the risk of revealing the password to anyone.  
3.4.1.2 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI ensures a secure method for exchanging sensitive information over unsecured 
networks. In addition, PKI [39-41] provides authenticated, private and non-reputable 
communications.   
 
PKI makes use of the technology known as public key cryptography. Public key 
cryptography uses a pair of keys to scramble and decipher messages, a public key and a 
private key. The public key is widely distributed whereas the private key is held secretly 
by an individual. Messages are protected from malicious people by scrambling them 
with the public key of the recipient. Only the recipient can decrypt the message by using 
his / her private key, thus retaining the privacy of the message. The public key is 
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distributed with a digital certificate that contains information that uniquely identifies an 
individual (for example name, email address, the date that the certificate was issued, and 
the name of the certificate authority which issued it). Also, by using digital certificates 
we can digitally sign messages to protect the integrity of the information itself and 
achieve non-repudiation (digitally signing a transaction is legally binding and no party 
can deny his /her participation).  
 
PKI support is often integrated into common applications such as web browsers and 
email programs validating certificates and signed messages. The PKI can also be 
implemented by an organization for its own use to authenticate users that handle 
sensitive information. The digital certificate can be used by the user to either be 
authenticated to a mobile device or to the healthcare application in order to be able to 
access it and use the available services. Although the use of PKI counters many threats 
associated with public networks it also introduces management overhead and additional 
hardware and software costs that should be evaluated. An appropriate risk assessment 
should be performed in order to select the appropriate countermeasures to meet the 
organization’s security requirements. Furthermore, there is a risk associated with the 
private key; the private key must be well-protected since if it is lost or compromised 
anyone could masquerade as the owner of the key. 
3.4.1.3 Smart card 
Anything that is unique and that the user is required to possess can be used as an 
authenticating token [70]. A token is generally issued to one user. A token is registered 
to a user, and when it is presented for authentication, the token is verified as being 
legitimate. The identifying label of the token is used to verify its registration, if it has 
been lost or stolen, and if the user ID presented with it matches. If it is a match, the user 
is authenticated. Otherwise, the authentication request is rejected. 
 
Tokens are generally made up of smart cards and Universal Serial Bus (USB) tokens. 
There is unique information stored on the token that identifies the possessor (i.e. a 
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private key). If a computer system accepts only the presentation of a token for 
authentication, then anyone who has that token can be authenticated. If the token is lost 
or stolen, entry can still be gained. However, passwords are employed with tokens to 
prevent this from happening. Thus, when a user wants to authenticate with a token, 
he/she inserts the token and then provides a password to unlock the credentials stored 
inside. The token and the password are used by the system to authenticate the user. This 
multi-factor authentication methodology still has the weaknesses of passwords because 
the token and associated password can be loaned or stolen. Still, simply knowing the 
password without the token is not sufficient for authentication. Both must be used 
together. 
3.4.1.4 Biometrics 
Biometric [60] technology drives the future direction of strong authentication. The 
promise of biometrics to protect data and safeguard identity from being stolen is very 
compelling. Like any technology, it has needed time to mature and find its place in the 
computing infrastructure of enterprises. The time for biometrics has never been better. 
The industry and technology have matured, and the applications of biometrics are 
growing every day. From replacing the need for password authentication to strongly 
binding physical and digital identities, biometrics is being put to work. 
 
A biometric is a physical or psychological trait that can be measured, recorded, and 
quantified. By doing this, we can use that trait to obtain a biometric enrollment. This 
way, we can say with a degree of certainty that someone is the same person in future 
biometric authentications based on their previous enrollment authentications. 
 
Biometric user authentication can be accomplished using unique characteristics i.e. face, 
voice, fingerprint, and retinal. Mobile devices usually use fingerprint and voice 
biometric authentication to give access to the systems; these authentication methods use 
more compact devices that are suitable for the mobility aspect of mobile devices. 
   
 40 
For example, fingerprint readers can be attached to the handheld devices through a 
serial or USB port and can be set to lock the whole device, to lock an individual 
application, or to connect to a remote database over a network or dial-up connection. 
 
The strong advantage of biometrics is that they use something which is entirely unique 
and an adversary may not posse it in any way. However, depending on the 
authentication method used, biometrics have a different cost that must be evaluated 
against the need to implement such technology. 
3.4.1.5 Scenario 
The following scenario describes how the authentication mechanisms are applied within 
the environment under evaluation. 
Figure 3.5: Authentication scenario 
3.4.2.1 Role separation 
Access control [42,43] is essential for any system that handles sensitive information. As 
mentioned earlier, mobile healthcare services raise extra considerations since they 
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support the continuity of life. Therefore, healthcare information must be accessed on a 
need-to-know basis. Since a mobile healthcare application requires a fixed infrastructure 
to function that hosts a number of servers such as web and database servers, appropriate 
configurations must be made to provide access to data only to the designated personnel. 
 
The most valuable asset of any healthcare application is the medical records that hold 
specific medical data about a patient i.e. health condition, medication treatment. This 
information is hosted and can be retrieved from the database server(s).  
 
Role separation must be implemented to provide increased database security. Since the 
healthcare sector involves a number of medical professionals i.e. nurses, oncologists, 
physiotherapists, there is the need to distinguish the rights and permissions of each 
professional. Before deploying the application, it is essential to perform a detailed 
analysis in order to design access rights for each group of users. According to the 
organization, all appropriate user roles must be identified and their responsibilities must 
be documented in order to define their permissions. Based on the permissions defined, 
each group of users will have an appropriate view of the data stored on the database 
server.        
3.4.2.2 Scenario 
The following scenario describes how the role separation is applied within the 
environment under evaluation. 
 
Every user is mapped onto a user account. Users are mapped to User defined roles. Each 
group of users has a different view of the system according to the credentials assigned 
to the defined role. 
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Figure 3.6: Role separation 
3.4.3 Integrity & Confidentiality 
3.4.3.1 Encryption 
There are many places where the data may be intercepted i.e. in thin-client, browser-
based applications, email, data synchronization, and client / server communications. In 
order to retain the integrity and confidentiality of the data it is a necessity to implement 
end-to-end encryption between the mobile devices and the fixed infrastructure or 
implement encryption on the device to encrypt stored data that need protection. 
Encryption can be achieved by technologies such as PKI and Virtual Private Networks, 
which are discussed next. 
3.4.3.2 PKI 
PKI [46] technology, which is discussed in 3.3.1.2 section, is used not only to 
authenticate a user but also to encrypt the information exchanged between two 
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communicating parties. The sender uses the digital certificate of the receiver to encrypt 
the information and then the receiver uses his / her private key to decrypt and read the 
information. Without the private key, the message is not possible to reconstruct to its 
original format.  
3.4.3.3 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
As mentioned earlier, a fixed infrastructure is used to support the operations of the 
mobile healthcare application. There are situations where it is necessary for an 
administrator or a user to remotely access his / her desktop or other equipment. This 
must be done in a secure way, for example by implementing a virtual private network. 
  
A VPN [47] allows a user to send data between two remote computers across a public 
network as he was using a point-to-point private link. Information sent over a VPN 
connection is kept private by using a tunnelling protocol and appropriate security 
procedures. Data is encrypted and encapsulated with a header containing routing 
information that is used to find its destination. In this way, even if the packets are 
intercepted, the attacker cannot read it or modify it without the changes be seen by the 
recipient. This functionality is what made companies use VPNs as sensitive information 
is still protected if someone manages to compromise the communication channel. 
 
The following figure shows a typical VPN connection. Observe that the part of the 
connection in which the private data is encapsulated is known as the tunnel. The part of 
the connection in which the private data is encrypted is known as the virtual private 
network (VPN) connection. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: VPN 
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  3.4.3.4 Scenario 
The following scenario describes how the PKI process will be applied within the 
environment under evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: PKI process 
3.4.4 Availability 
Availability has always been an important characteristic of systems but becomes an 
even more critical and complex issue on networks. Healthcare sector operates on a 24 / 
7 basis. Therefore, the flow of information must be continuous and not break off in any 
way.  
 
This requirement is crucial, especially when maintaining a mobile healthcare 
application. In many cases, medical professionals like nurses may visit patients who are 
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located away from a fully equipped hospital and use their mobile device to connect with 
the hospital’s database and retrieve information about the patient. This communication 
must be retained at all times so that nurses can respond immediately to emergencies.   
3.4.4.1 Fail Safe Plan 
In sensitive areas like the healthcare sector, the implementation and operation of 
healthcare applications must be performed in a well-designed environment. The main 
idea is to be precautious and have a fail safe plan implemented so that if anything 
happens (due to physical threats like fires or a security violation) with the primary 
infrastructure, a secondary infrastructure will take over until the problem is solved; this 
means that equipment must be redundant so that operation will continuously be 
supported. This plan may introduce overhead in managing the two infrastructures but it 
is a cost that needs to be taken since the benefit to be gained is more important. 
3.4.4.2 Backups 
In order to support a fail safe plan, it is necessary to maintain appropriate backups of the 
critical data hosted on systems. Data to be backuped may include medical records, 
security configurations and any other data that is considered to be critical for operation 
and must be accessible in a 24 / 7 basis. Data must be stored on removable media or 
other redundant equipment that are well protected (i.e. locked down) and be used 
immediately if a system crashes and goes down. Usually, backup copies are stored in a 
separate facility or in a fire-rated container that is not co-located with the operational 
software. Frequency of backing up is dependent upon how frequently the information is 
modified, as well as the criticality of the data. For instance, if the database is updated 
daily and if the organization would suffer operationally without the information in the 
database, then backups should be done on a daily basis.  
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3.4.4.3 UPS 
Since we are dealing with a network based application that requires an Internet 
connection to access services and resources, it is essential to guarantee the continuous 
provision of power supply. A UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) can be used to 
ensure the availability of systems and their operation. 
3.4.4.4 Scenario 
The following scenario describes how availability could be achieved within the 
environment under evaluation. An appropriate secondary architecture is designed and 
will be implemented soon; if the primary architecture is unavailable, the redundant 
infrastructure will be used until the problem is solved.  Currently, data is backuped on a 
daily basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Fail Safe Plan 
3.4.5 Non-repudiation 
One of the biggest challenges in healthcare computing systems is to convince users that 
they will not be blamed for something they haven’t done. For example, a doctor 
changes the medical treatment of a patient. The system must identify who made the 
change and also the details of the modification. The nurse is only responsible for 
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providing treatment according to the prescribed protocol; she is not responsible for its 
selection. Therefore, the system must implement appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
non-repudiating actions, where a user cannot later deny an action taken. 
3.4.5.1 History tables 
As mentioned earlier, a mobile healthcare application is supported by a fixed 
infrastructure, where a variety of systems host sensitive data like the patients’ medical 
records. Since it is important to record a number of events like who accessed certain 
information, who made a change and where, when a modification happened etc, it is 
essential to implement history tables on the database level. 
 
The database server that hosts the data must be configured appropriately so that history 
tables are created. The history tables will contain all the recorded events so that a user 
action can be tracked down if necessary. For an enhanced level of security, the history 
tables must only be accessed by the administrator of the systems or other designated 
personnel; in addition to this, the tables must be encrypted so that noone who has access 
to the database server will be able to read and modify the tables.   
3.4.5.2 Digital signatures 
A digital signature [46] has the same purpose as a handwritten signature. When a user 
digitally signs an electronic document (email, spreadsheet, text file etc.) he provides a 
mean to the recipient to authenticate him as the writer of the document. In addition, by 
receiving a digitally signed document a user can verify that it has not been altered in any 
way since the writer created it. The digital signature is created within the PKI 
framework. 
 
The importance of using digital signatures is crucial to all B2B, B2C or C2C 
transactions as it guarantees non-reputable communication; this means that the 
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transacting parties cannot deny later on that they performed a specific action, for 
example a customer sending an order to a company.    
 
Digital signatures are created and verified by public key cryptography. A user to send a 
digitally signed message to Bob must follow the procedure: 
 
1. First the sender uses his signing software on the message to compute a message 
digest. This process is called hashing. Have in mind that the process is 
irreversible meaning that it is impossible to change the message digest back into 
the original data from which it was created. 
2. Then the user uses the signing software to encrypt the message digest with his 
private key. Doing so, he creates his digital signature. 
3. The signing software appends the digital signature to the document. He then 
sends the message to his dear friend Bob. 
4. Now that Bob has received the message will try to verify that it is sent by the 
indented sender and that the message has not been altered by a third party. So, 
Bob uses his software to decrypt the digital signature by using the user’s public 
key, and gets the message digest. 
a. If the decryption is successful Bob knows that the user signed the 
document. After all he is the only one who has the corresponding private 
key to the public key Bob used. 
5. Then, Bob uses his software to compute the message digest (also known as hash 
value) of the received message. 
6. The software checks that the computed message digest is the same with the 
message digest created when the digital signature was decrypted. 
a. If the verification is successful Bob knows that noone has altered the 
signed message. 
 
By using digital signatures in a healthcare application, we achieve non-repudiating 
actions. For example, a doctor changing the medical treatment of a patient cannot later 
deny his action. However, it is important to educate the users about issues like the 
importance of protecting the private key; if someone else compromises the key then he 
would be able to sign documents on behalf of the user owning the key.  
 49 
 
Furthermore, it is essential to make a background research and find out if the legislation 
supports the operation of digital signatures and whether such evidence is accepted by a 
court of law. 
3.4.5.3 Confidentiality documents  
 
Although users must be convinced for the transparency of the communications, they 
also have responsibilities against patients and against the organization offering the 
healthcare services. 
 
Medical personnel accessing medical information have a responsibility to maintain the 
privacy of the data. After all, a patient’s reputation may be damaged if his medical 
condition is publicized, for example he could loose his job. 
 
In addition to the medical personnel, the development personnel of the healthcare 
application may have access to confidential documents [48]. Therefore, it is critical to 
create confidentiality and code of ethics documents that must be signed by both medical 
and development personnel (Appendix B). By signing these documents, all personnel 
recognize the importance of keeping information confidential and also the 
responsibilities they have towards the organization.  Note that the documents must 
adhere to local and national data protection laws. 
 
To retain the non-repudiating objective, it is important to bind the patients as well. The 
patients must sign an appropriate form, acknowledging and permitting the storage and 
processing of their personal and medical information for providing an enhanced quality 
of care. In this way, the healthcare team is legally covered in a case of a lawsuit. 
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3.4.6 Security awareness and training 
Security awareness is often an overlooked element of security management because 
most of a security practitioner’s time is spent on controls, intrusion detection, risk 
assessment, and proactively or reactively administering security. 
 
It should not be that way, however. People are often the weakest link in a security chain 
because they are not trained or generally aware of what security is all about. Employees 
must understand how their actions, even seemingly insignificant actions, can greatly 
impact the overall security position of an organization. 
 
Employees must be aware of the need to secure information and to protect the 
information assets of an enterprise. Operators need training in the skills that are required 
to fulfill their job functions securely, and security practitioners need training to 
implement and maintain the necessary security controls. 
 
All employees need education in the basic concepts of security and its benefits to an 
organization. The benefits of the three pillars of security awareness training -awareness, 
training, and education - will manifest themselves through an improvement in the 
behavior and attitudes of personnel and through a significant improvement in an 
enterprise’s security. 
 
The purpose of computer security awareness, training, and education is to enhance 
security by: 
 
• Improving awareness of the need to protect system resources 
• Developing skills and knowledge so computer users can perform their jobs more 
securely 
• Building in-depth knowledge, as needed, to design, implement, or operate security 
programs for organizations and systems 
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An effective computer security awareness and training program requires proper 
planning, implementation, maintenance, and periodic evaluation. In general, a computer 
security awareness and training program should encompass the following seven steps: 
 
1. Identify program scope, goals, and objectives. 
2. Identify training staff. 
3. Identify target audiences. 
4. Motivate management and employees. 
5. Administer the program. 
6. Maintain the program. 
7. Evaluate the program. 
 
Making computer system users aware of their security responsibilities and teaching 
them correct practices helps users change their behavior. It also supports individual 
accountability because without the knowledge of the necessary security measures and 
how to use them, users cannot be truly accountable for their actions. 
3.4.7 Physical security 
Physical security [49] controls are implemented to protect the facility housing system 
resources, the system resources themselves, and the facilities used to support their 
operation. 
 
Physical security controls include the following three broad areas: 
 
1. The physical facility is usually the building, other structure, or vehicle housing 
the system and network components. Systems can be characterized, based upon 
their operating location, as static, mobile, or portable. Static systems are 
installed in structures at fixed locations. Mobile systems are installed in vehicles 
that perform the function of a structure, but not at a fixed location. Portable 
systems are not installed in fixed operating locations. They may be operated in 
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wide variety of locations, including buildings or vehicles, or in the open. The 
physical characteristics of these structures and vehicles determine the level of 
such physical threats as fire, roof leaks, or unauthorized access. 
2. The facility's general geographic operating location determines the 
characteristics of natural threats, which include earthquakes and flooding; man-
made threats such as burglary, civil disorders, or interception of transmissions 
and emanations; and damaging nearby activities, including toxic chemical spills, 
explosions, fires, and electromagnetic interference from emitters, such as radars. 
3. Supporting facilities are those services (both technical and human) that underpin 
the operation of the system. The system's operation usually depends on 
supporting facilities such as electric power, heating and air conditioning, and 
telecommunications. The failure or substandard performance of these facilities 
may interrupt operation of the system and may cause physical damage to system 
hardware or stored data. 
 
In this study, the investigation concerns physical access controls that restrict the entry 
and exit of personnel (and often equipment and media) from an area, such as an office 
building, suite, data center, or room containing a LAN server. 
 
The controls over physical access to the elements of a system can include controlled 
areas, barriers that isolate each area, entry points in the barriers, and screening measures 
at each of the entry points. In addition, staff members who work in a restricted area 
serve an important role in providing physical security, as they can be trained to 
challenge people they do not recognize. 
 
Physical access controls should address not only the area containing system hardware, 
but also locations of wiring used to connect elements of the system, the electric power 
service, the air conditioning and heating plant, telephone and data lines, backup media 
and source documents, and any other elements required system's operation. This means 
that all the areas in the building(s) that contain system elements must be identified. 
 
It is also important to review the effectiveness of physical access controls in each area, 
both during normal business hours, and at other times particularly when an area may be 
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unoccupied. Effectiveness depends on both the characteristics of the control devices 
used (e.g., keycard-controlled doors) and the implementation and operation. Statements 
to the effect that "only authorized persons may enter this area" are not particularly 
effective. Organizations should determine whether intruders can easily defeat the 
controls, the extent to which strangers are challenged, and the effectiveness of other 
control procedures. Factors like these modify the effectiveness of physical controls. 
 
A number of physical security devices exist and can be used to prevent unauthorized 
access, intentional damage or destruction, or theft of computer equipment and 
components such as alarms, locks, cabinets, cable kits, lock down plates and special 
security screws. 
 
In the case of portable and mobile systems, they share an increased risk of theft and 
physical damage. In addition, portable systems can be "misplaced" or left unattended by 
careless users. Secure storage of portable and mobile systems is often required when 
they are not in use. If a mobile or portable system uses particularly valuable or 
important data, it may be appropriate to either store its data on a medium that can be 
removed from the system when it is unattended or to encrypt the data. 
3.4.8 Auditing 
Auditing [71] is used to check systems to see whether a particular system is meeting 
stated security requirements, including system and organization policies, and whether 
security controls are appropriate. Informal audits can be performed by those operating 
the system under review or, if impartiality is important, by outside auditors. 
 
Thus, audits can be self-administered or independent (either internal or external). Both 
types can provide excellent information about technical, procedural, managerial, or 
other aspects of security. The essential difference between a self-audit and an 
independent audit is objectivity. Reviews done by system management staff, often 
called self-audits/assessments, have an inherent conflict of interest. The system 
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management staff may have little incentive to say that the computer system was poorly 
designed or is sloppily operated. On the other hand, they may be motivated by a strong 
desire to improve the security of the system. In addition, they are knowledgeable about 
the system and may be able to find hidden problems. 
 
The independent auditor, by contrast, should have no professional stake in the system. 
Independent audit may be performed by a professional audit staff in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards. 
 
There are two types of automated audit tools: (1) active tools, which find vulnerabilities 
by trying to exploit them, and (2) passive tests, which only examine the system and 
infer the existence of problems from the state of the system. 
 
Automated tools can be used to help find a variety of threats and vulnerabilities, such as 
improper access controls or access control configurations, weak passwords, lack of 
integrity of the system software, or not using all relevant software updates and patches. 
These tools are often very successful at finding vulnerabilities and are sometimes used 
by hackers to break into systems. Not taking advantage of these tools puts system 
administrators at a disadvantage. Many of the tools are simple to use; however, some 
programs (such as access-control auditing tools for large mainframe systems) require 
specialized skill to use and interpret. 
3.4.9 Security Policies 
In order to ensure that computer systems are used in an effective and productive way, it 
is important that the owners, operators and users of these systems have a clear 
understanding of acceptable standards of use. The primary step in securing an electronic 
system is developing and implementing a variety of security policies [50,72].  
 
Security policies are the foundation and the bottom line of information security in an 
organization. A well-written and implemented policy contains sufficient information on 
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what must be done to protect information and people in the organization (Appendix A). 
It is important to establish who the authorized users might be, how they will access the 
system and data, how unauthorized users will be denied access, and how data will be 
protected within the organization as well as outside the organization. In general, 
thoroughly planned security policies set directions and procedures as well as define 
penalties and countermeasures if the policy is transgressed. 
  
In order for a security policy to be viable for the long term, it requires a lot of flexibility 
based upon an architectural security concept. A security policy should be (largely) 
independent from specific hardware and software situations (as specific systems tend to 
be replaced or moved overnight). The mechanisms for updating the policy should be 
clearly spelled out. This includes the process, the people involved, and the people who 
must sign-off on the changes. 
 
Once the security policy has been established it should be clearly communicated to 
users, staff, and management. Having all personnel sign a statement indicating that they 
have read, understood, and agreed to abide by the policy is an important part of the 
process. Finally, the policy should be reviewed on a regular basis to see if it is 
successfully supporting your security needs.  
 
Following, a variety of policies that could be implemented according to each situation 
are listed: 
 
• Password policy 
• Anti-virus policy 
• Email policy 
• Encryption policy 
• Remote access policy 
• Audit policy 
• Internet access policy 
• Intrusion detection policy 
• Security incident handling policy 
• Portable and mobile systems usage 
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3.4.10 Security tools 
A variety of security tools exist to support and maintain security of systems. 
3.4.10.1 Anti-virus 
 
If there's one word that can strike fear in the heart of any computer user, especially one 
who accesses the internet, or exchanges diskettes, that word is, "virus." Viruses can 
generate so much fear in the cyber world that news of a new virus often spreads faster 
than the virus itself. On line viruses are a fact of internet life. Anti-virus programs are 
the most effective means of fighting viruses. Anti-virus software is cheap, easy 
insurance against outside attackers. Basic anti-virus software works by scanning stored 
files on a computer for the telltale signatures of viruses. The principle of operation of 
anti-virus scanners is based on checks of files, sectors and system memory, and search 
for known and new (unknown to scanner) viruses.  
 
There are two primary components to anti-virus software: the virus-scanning engine 
(which performs the virus check) and the data files (which tell the scanning engine what 
to look for). Data files are updated more frequently than scanning engines, but both 
components do need to be updated. Two companies dominate the anti-virus market: 
Symantec, makers of Norton AntiVirus and Network Associates, publishers of McAffee 
Anti-Virus. 
3.4.10.2 Firewall 
The most common building block of an effective security architecture is the firewall 
approach. Firewalls constitute the first line of defense for the enterprise’s interface with 
the external (i.e. internet) environment in protecting private information. The Internet is 
a volatile and unsafe environment, therefore a firewall must be positioned to control all 
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incoming and outgoing traffic and enhance the safeguard of the enterprise’s assets from 
any threat that may come from the net. 
 
Several kinds of firewalls are available and each has its merits and drawbacks. The key 
to successfully implementing a firewall is finding the kind of firewall that best suits a 
particular network's needs. There are two basic types of firewall, or two ways a firewall 
can function: Packet filter or proxy firewalls. Within each type, though, are different 
implementations.  
 
A packet filter rests between the internal network and the rest of the world. Clients and 
servers connect directly, but the packets pass through the packet filter to travel between 
the internal network and the outside world. When packets pass through, the packet filter 
compares the packets to a set of filter rules (criteria such as service type, port number, 
interface number, source address, and destination address). If the configuration is set up 
to permit a packet, it continues its travels through the network, forwarded on to its next 
hop. If the configuration does not permit the packet, it is discarded.  
 
On networks with packet filters, a connection is formed directly between the client and 
the server. Proxies break up the connection between the client and the server. The proxy 
server type of firewall attempts to hide the configuration of the network behind the 
firewall by acting on behalf of that network, or as a "proxy." All requests for access are 
translated at the firewall so that all packets are sent to and from the firewall, rather than 
from the hosts behind the firewall. No direct communication takes place between the 
client and the server. If an attacker tries to play tricks by working with fragmented 
packets or fields in the IP packet, the internal server never sees it. 
3.4.10.3 Intrusion detection system  
As exposure and risks increase, organizations seek new ways to improve their network 
security. Most commonly we hear of firewalls, authentication tools, and antivirus 
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applications, but the generally accepted best practice of defense in depth requires more, 
hence the recent attention being paid to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). 
 
With the number of intrusion and hacking incidents around the world on the rise, the 
importance of having dependable intrusion detection systems in place is greater than 
ever. Offering both a developmental and technical perspective on this crucial element of 
network security, Intrusion Detection covers: practical considerations for selecting and 
implementing intrusion detection systems; methods of handling the results of analysis, 
and the options for responses to detected problems, data sources commonly used in 
intrusion detection and how they influence the capabilities of all intrusion detection 
systems; legal issues surrounding detection and monitoring that affect the design, 
development, and operation of intrusion detection systems. More than just an overview 
of the technology, Intrusion Detection presents real analysis schemes and responses, as 
well as a detailed discussion of the vulnerabilities inherent in many systems, and 
approaches to testing systems for these problems. 
 
Intrusion Detection Systems function alerting to intrusions and attacks aimed at 
computers or networks. They are your eyes and ears, essential in knowing whether you 
are under attack. Traditionally, there have been two main classes of intrusion detection 
systems: host-based and network-based systems. 
 
A host-based intrusion detection system monitors the detailed activity of a particular 
computer host in real-time. Host-based systems were the development of network-based 
intrusion detection systems. While some network-based system focus on a single host, 
most typically monitor a network of computers and other devices (i.e. routers, 
gateways) that are subject to attacks. The IDS system attempts to detect known attack 
"signatures" or attack patterns within the activity of computer's operation and notify 
accordingly the administrator. 
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3.5 Security based on Information Classification 
There are several good reasons to classify information. Not all data has the same value 
to an organization. Some data is more valuable to the people who are making strategic 
decisions because it aids them in making long-term or short-term business direction 
decisions. Some data, such as trade secrets, formulas, and new product information, is 
so valuable that its loss could create a significant problem for the enterprise in the 
marketplace by creating public embarrassment or by causing a lack of credibility. 
Furthermore, in a healthcare environment the well being (in certain cases it can even be 
life threatening) of patients depends on it. For these reasons, it is obvious that 
information classification has a higher, enterprise-level benefit. Information can have an 
impact on a business globally, not just on the business unit or line operations levels. Its 
primary purpose is to enhance confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and to 
minimize the risks to the information. In addition, by focusing the protection 
mechanism and controls on the information areas that need it the most, a more efficient 
cost-to-benefit ratio is achieved. 
 
A number of guides [51-54] exists today providing information on how to classify 
confidential information for a variety of sectors like the government and the healthcare 
sector. Furthermore, a variety of formal security models have been developed to model 
access control requirements to specific resources through a defined security policy. The 
Bell-La Padula [55] framework models access control requirements focusing on the 
confidentiality of classified information; the Biba framework [56] models a set of access 
control rules designed to ensure that data are not contaminated; the Brewer-Nash [57] 
framework models access control requirements that can change dynamically; the 
Graham and Denning [58] framework models a set of basic rights on how specific 
subjects can execute security functions on an object. 
 
Through out our research, no security framework has been detected modelling the 
implementation of security technologies according to information’s classification 
sensitivity, particularly in the healthcare environment. However, healthcare security 
frameworks exist, although that they do not take into consideration information 
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classification. Markovic et al. [32] overview modern security systems which are used in 
medical electronic business systems and mobile healthcare systems. Bourka et al. [41] 
describe and assess the integration of Public Key Infrastructure security mechanisms 
(such as strong authentication and encryption) in an electronic referral and prescription 
application. Spinellis et al. [59] proposed a secure framework for web-based telemedical 
applications defining among others the relationship between security services and 
security concepts and technologies. Misra et al. [5] address the security challenges 
raised by mobile communication and discuss the wired equivalent security showing how 
this concept can be applied to achieve end-to-end security in a mobile healthcare 
environment. 
 
In this section, we propose a security-level information classification scheme [67] 
associated with the appropriate security technologies and the objective these 
technologies serve, that can be adopted in a healthcare environment. The proposed 
scheme aims to balance the trade-off between security complexity and performance. In 
this way, implementing a complex and flat security architecture that will degrade the 
performance of the provided services can be prevented. Security technologies must be 
used in a smart and efficient way in order to balance security complexity and 
performance. 
3.5.1   Information classification benefits 
Information classification has the longest history in the government sector. Its value has 
been established, and it is a required component when securing trusted systems. In this 
sector, information classification is primarily used to prevent the unauthorized 
disclosure and the resultant failure of confidentiality. 
 
Information classification can be used in any sector to comply with privacy laws, or to 
enable regulatory compliance. A company may wish to employ classification to 
maintain a competitive edge in a tough marketplace. There may also be sound legal 
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reasons for a company to employ information classification, such as to minimize 
liability or to protect valuable business information. 
 
In addition to the reasons mentioned previously, employing information classification 
has several clear benefits to an organization. Some of these benefits are as follows: 
 
- Demonstrates an organization’s commitment to security protections 
- Helps identify which information is the most sensitive or vital to an organization 
- Supports the tenets of confidentiality, integrity, and availability as it pertains to data 
- Helps identify which protections apply to which information 
- May be required for regulatory, compliance, or legal reasons 
3.5.2   Information classification concepts 
According to the Council of Europe Recommendation R(97)5 on the Protection of 
Medical Data “Appropriate technical and organizational measures shall be taken to 
protect personal data - processed in accordance with this recommendation - against 
accidental or illegal destruction, accidental loss, as well as against unauthorized 
access, alteration, communication or any other form of processing. Such measures shall 
ensure an appropriate level of security taking account, on the one hand, of the technical 
state of the art and, on the other hand, of the sensitive nature of medical data and the 
evaluation of potential risks.”  
 
It is obvious that the medical data is placed on the center of all efforts towards security. 
The information produced or processed by an organization must be classified according 
to the organization’s sensitivity to its loss or disclosure. This approach enables the 
security controls to be properly implemented according to its classification scheme. 
 
As stated earlier, a number of guides [51-54] provide guidance on how to classify [61-
63] confidential information. 
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The proposed healthcare security framework defines a four level classification based on 
the aforementioned guides: 
 
1. Public level. Information is categorized in the public level if it is intended to be used 
by any interested party. This level includes: educational material, press releases, 
annual reports, and statistics. The public release of this information does not violate 
security requirements; therefore, security mechanisms are not needed for this level. 
2. Internal Use Only level. Although this information is intended to be used internally, 
compromization will not impact the organization. Internal Use Only information 
involves demographics, internal reports, appointments and the virtual team assigned 
to each patient. Security is required but can be kept at minimum levels. 
3. Confidential level. This category involves patients’ medical records that are accessed 
by appropriate personnel on a need-to-know basis. Medical records include, among 
others, information on medical history, symptoms, diagnosis, treatment and 
medication.  Security at this category must be highly defined. 
4. Highly confidential level. This level involves medical records of special content such 
as information related to physical abuse, HIV status, and abortions. Furthermore, it 
includes medical records of recognized people (such as the president of a country) 
that their work position is considered critical. 
 
Information was classified according to ISO/ IEC17799 [64] recommendations; 
information should be labelled according to how: 
 
• valuable 
• sensitive  
• critical it is 
 
and how much protection it needs. 
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3.5.3   Security-level Information Classification Scheme 
As discussed earlier, labeling information into sensitivity classes can help us provide the 
appropriate protection by applying the necessary security measures for each situation. A 
number of formal security models exists that define the access control rights a subject 
may have on a specified category of information, according to the access control profile 
that is assigned to it. However, security frameworks do not exist associating information 
classification with the required security technologies that are needed to be implemented 
based on information’s sensitivity. By developing such a framework, our aim is to 
provide guidance on the minimum measures/ technologies that are needed to be 
implemented without saturating the performance of the entire system/ application.  
 
Table 2 indicates the relationship between the classification of information, the security 
objectives and technologies discussed in the previous sections. All these, formulate a 
security-level classification scheme of information associated with the appropriate 
security technologies and the objective these technologies serve, that can be adopted in 
a healthcare environment. The scheme defines the minimum guidelines that should be 
followed to safeguard the information classified under each level. 
 
For Public-level information, security is seamless since this type of information can be 
used by anyone who has an interest on it. Minimum security measures that can be 
applied are: a monthly backup of the information that for example resides on the web 
server; frequency of backing up is dependent upon how frequently the information is 
modified, as well as the criticality of the data. Physical security measures such as access 
control to facilities are recommended to safeguard the systems/ machines that are 
hosting this kind of information. Although the scheme does not address integrity issues 
on this level, the organization, according to its needs, may require that information 
classified under public level must be accurate. If this is the case, then appropriate 
security must be applied i.e. encryption. 
 
For Internal-Use-Only-level information, security is required on a basic level. Access to 
this kind of information should be controlled through appropriate user profiles that are 
assigned to users that provide their username and password to get verified by the 
 64 
system. Simple history logs should be kept in order to have a view of the people that 
access specific information; backups can be taken at least twice a week since 
information like appointments and internal reports are defined within the week. The 
backup scheme is always depended on the organization’s needs and requirements and 
someone cannot say with accuracy how frequently the backup should be. If the 
organization is operated in a way that, for example, daily reports are created backing up 
the system may be needed on a daily basis. Also physical security is necessary to 
protect unauthorized access to servers and other equipment.   
 
For Confidential-level information, security must cover at least the principle security 
technologies/ measures listed under each security objective. Information that is 
classified under this category is a valuable asset for the organization and it needs to be 
protected. Users should use basic authentication to access the system based on the 
access-right profile assigned to them and any communication established between the 
users and the infrastructure using public networks should be encrypted. Appropriate 
changes made on medical records should be digitally signed to achieve accountability 
on users’ activities. History logs should be maintained to control access to the systems, 
failures etc. This kind of information should be audited frequently, as well as the entire 
system, in order to ensure that the implemented security measures are adequate. Medical 
professionals should sign appropriate confidentiality documents recognizing their 
responsibility in protecting the privacy of medical records. Backups should be applied at 
least twice a day. Frequency of back up will be dictated by ability of person using the 
system to recall their entries. For example, we assume that a health professional 
changing a medication entry for a patient can recall the change he made, if he is asked 
to within the next few hours. However, this is a complex subject and a matter of further 
research. Physical security is required as previously and finally a fail safe plan must be 
in place so if the primary infrastructure is unavailable, a secondary infrastructure will be 
used in order to provide access to medical records that may be needed in urgent 
situations. 
 
For Highly-Confidential-level information, a complete and sound security 
implementation must be provided; in this case, the security framework must implement 
all the security techniques/ measures that are listed under each security objective of the 
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table. This category includes all the measures discussed in the previous category and in 
addition it implements smart card and/ or biometric technologies to be used by 2 key-
people personnel to access top-secret medical information.      
  
 
 
CLASSIFICATION 
OBJECTIVES TECHNOLOGIES Public Level Internal Use Only Confidential 
Level 
Highly Confidential 
I&C 
Encryption 
(PKI,VPN) 
NO NO YES YES 
Fail Safe Plan NO NO YES YES 
Availability 
Backups YES (2/ month) YES (2/week) YES (2/day) YES (2/day) 
Password NO YES YES YES 
PKI NO NO YES YES 
Smart Card NO NO NO YES 
A&A 
Biometrics NO NO NO YES 
History NO YES YES YES 
Digital Signatures NO NO YES YES 
Confidentiality docs NO NO YES YES 
Accountability 
Auditing NO NO YES YES 
Logical Access Role Separation NO YES YES YES 
Physical Access Physical Security YES YES YES YES 
I&C = Integrity & Confidentiality, A&A = Authentication & Authorization 
 
Table 2: Security-level information classification scheme 
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Chapter 4 
Evaluation 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 ISO/ IEC 17799 
4.3 Evaluation analysis 
4.4 Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
Users need confidence in the security of the system they are using. The system’s 
security capabilities and procedures must represent the security needs and requirements 
of users that rely on the system to perform their job well. Although users could rely 
upon the word of the vendors of the systems, most users prefer to rely on the results of 
some form of assessment conducted by an independent body. For a system, an 
evaluation of its security capabilities can be viewed as a part of a more formal 
procedure for accepting an IT system for use within a particular environment. 
Accreditation is the term often used to describe this procedure. It requires a number of 
factors to be considered before a system can be viewed as fit for its intended purpose: it 
requires assurance in the security provided by the system, a confirmation of 
management responsibilities for security, compliance with relevant technical and 
legal/regulatory requirements, and confidence in the adequacy of other non-technical 
security measures provided in the system environment. Such an evaluation of a system 
requires objective and well-defined security evaluation criteria that are going to be used 
to measure the appropriateness of the system. 
 
 67 
The evaluation of the proposed security framework is still in progress as DITIS security 
is still in the development phase. However, we could assess the completeness of the 
framework against well-known practices.  
 
The proposed framework will be evaluated against the ISO/ IEC 17799 [64] standard 
that defines the code of practice for information security management. The result of the 
evaluation is expected to show if the proposed security framework implements adequate 
techniques and procedures providing the needed protection in the healthcare 
environment, and particularly for the system in question. 
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4.2 ISO/ IEC 17799  
ISO/IEC 17799 is an information security standard published in 2005 by the 
International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission. It is entitled Information technology - Security techniques - Code of 
practice for information security management. The current standard is a revision of the 
version published in 2000, which was a word-for-word copy of the British Standard BS 
7799-1:1999. 
 
ISO/IEC 17799 provides best practice recommendations on information security 
management for use by those who are responsible for initiating, implementing or 
maintaining information security management systems. Information security is defined 
within the standard as the preservation of confidentiality (ensuring that information is 
accessible only to those authorized to have access), integrity (safeguarding the 
accuracy and completeness of information and processing methods) and availability 
(ensuring that authorized users have access to information and associated assets when 
required). 
 
The standard contains the following sections: 
 
• Security policy  
• Organization of information security  
• Asset classification and control  
• Personnel security  
• Physical and environmental security  
• Communications and operations management  
• Access control  
• Systems development and maintenance  
• Business continuity management  
• Compliance  
 
Within each section, information security objectives are specified and a range of 
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controls are outlined that are generally regarded as best practice means of achieving 
those objectives. For each of the controls, implementation guidance is provided. 
Specific controls are not mandated since (a) each organization is expected to undertake 
a structured information security risk assessment process to determine its requirements 
before selecting controls that are appropriate to its particular circumstances and (b) it is 
practically impossible to list all conceivable controls in a general purpose standard. 
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4.3 Evaluation analysis 
ISO/IEC 17799 is a code of practice. As such, it addresses topics in term of policies and 
offers guidelines for information security management. It is meant to provide a high 
level, general description of the areas currently considered important when initiating, 
implementing or maintaining information security in an organization. It is noted, 
however, that the standard is a starting point for developing organization guidance and 
additional security controls not contained may be required.  
 
Since it is not feasible to conduct a complete system-technical evaluation as DITIS has 
not reached its final operational state and security is still an on-going activity, ISO/ IEC 
17799 has been selected to be used for evaluating the proposed security framework. The 
standard deals with the examination of non-technical issues related to personnel, 
procedural, physical security and security management in general. Therefore, it could be 
useful as a high-level evaluation of the proposed security framework since it is not 
practical yet to perform a technical evaluation of DITIS security features. 
 
The standard addresses specific guidelines for each one of the areas listed in section 4.2.  
Each security area defined in the standard will be used against the techniques and 
measures presented in the proposed framework, evaluating if the framework adequately 
covers the objectives listed under each of these area. The evaluation will be applied on a 
high level and will not assess technical details. An appropriate analysis follows 
comparing the objectives and guidelines within each section of the standard with the 
security techniques and procedures proposed in our framework. At the end, the 
evaluation will identify the areas of the proposed framework that need to address 
additional security measures in order to meet the objectives of the ISO/ IEC 17799 
standard. 
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Figure 4.1: Security aspects of DITIS 
4.3.1 Security policy  
The objective of this area is to provide management direction and support for 
information security in the organization. Throughout the standard, it appears that there 
is the need to design a variety of security policies, covering many technical and non-
technical aspects of a system.  
 
The proposed security framework provides a template for designing a set of security 
policies; password, antivirus, email, encryption, remote access, audit and internet access 
policy is covered. The actual security policies are expected to be finalized when DITIS 
reaches an operational level. However, some samples of template documents which will 
form part of the Security Policy document for DITIS are provided in Appendix A.  
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4.3.2 Organization of information security 
Organization of information security involves the management of the information 
security within the organization. A management framework should be established to 
initiate and control the implementation of information security within the organization. 
Suitable management should be established to approve the information security policy, 
assign security roles and coordinate the implementation of security across the 
organization.  Furthermore, this section defines that access to the organization’s 
information assets by third parties such as IT service providers, maintenance and 
support staff, consultants and contractors should be controlled. Information security 
requirements should be included in contracts with such third parties. 
 
The proposed security framework does not explicitly define a security management 
framework; rather it focuses on the security techniques and procedures that could be 
applied. However, since information security is a business responsibility shared by all 
members of the management team, a clear direction and visible management support for 
security initiatives should therefore be considered. The security management should be 
responsible for the following: 
 
• Reviewing and approving information security policy and overall 
responsibilities 
• Monitoring significant changes in the exposure of information assets to major 
threats 
• Reviewing and monitoring information security incidents 
• Approving major initiatives to enhance information security 
  
Regarding third-party access to the organization’s information assets, appropriate legal 
documents are created based on European and local data protection laws that third-party 
users must sign, recognizing their responsibility of protecting the organization’s assets. 
These documents can be found in Appendix B. 
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4.3.3 Asset classification and control 
The objective of this section is to provide guidance on protecting the organizational 
assets. It firstly defines that all major information assets should be accounted for and 
have a nominated owner. Accountability for assets helps to ensure that appropriate 
protection is maintained. Furthermore, information classification is needed to ensure 
that information assets receive an appropriate level of protection. Information should be 
classified to indicate the need, priorities and degree of protection. Information has 
varying degrees of sensitivity and criticality. An information classification system 
should be used to define an appropriate set of protection level, and communicate the 
need for special handling measures.   
 
Our framework makes use of the OCTAVE risk evaluation methodology to identify the 
risks associated with DITIS environment and operation. Throughout the risk evaluation 
process, the assets of the organization were identified as well as how valuable they are 
for the organization. Based on this information the organization can then provide levels 
of protection commensurate with the value and importance of the assets. The proposed 
framework also defines an appropriate information classification scheme that 
determines how the information is to be handled and protected; labeling of information 
is defined in terms of information’s value and sensitivity to the organization.  
4.3.4 Personnel security 
Personnel security aims in reducing the risks of human error, theft, fraud or misuse of 
the organization’s assets. All employees and third-party users of information processing 
facilities should sign a confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreement. Furthermore, user 
training is required to ensure that users are aware of information security threats and 
concerns, and are equipped to support organizational security policy in the course of 
their normal work. In addition, users should be trained in security procedures and the 
correct use of information processing facilities to minimize possible security risks. 
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Finally, this section defines the need of having appropriate procedures to respond to 
security incidents and malfunctions. 
 
The proposed security framework addresses personnel security with the design of 1) 
appropriate confidentiality agreements and code of ethics documents that are signed by 
all individuals working for the organization (samples are provided in Appendix B), 2) 
an education and training framework that provides guidelines for creating awareness 
activities within the organization and 3) incident response policy that defines the 
procedures for reporting an incident as quickly as possible to the designated point of 
contact. An appropriate template policy which will be used in DITIS Security policy is 
included in Appendix A. 
4.3.5 Physical and environmental security  
The objective of this area covers the need to prevent unauthorized access, damage and 
interference to organization’s premises and information. Sensitive information 
processing facilities should be housed in secure areas, protected by a defined security 
perimeter, with appropriate security barriers and entry controls. The protection provided 
should be commensurate with the identified risks. 
 
The proposed framework covers physical security on a high level, providing the 
principle concepts that should be addressed in the organization’s environment. More 
detailed guidelines should be addressed in the actual environment, after taking into 
consideration the organization’s facilities. 
4.3.6 Communications and operations management 
 This section covers security aspects of IT systems and network operations activities. It 
identifies the need of having operations procedures and responsibilities to ensure the 
correct and secure operation of the system. The procedures cover incident management 
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procedures, monitoring activities, system acceptance criteria, controls against malicious 
software, backup routines, network security, and email security. 
 
The proposed framework addresses the aforementioned issues. Incident management 
procedures are provided through an appropriate security policy document, history and 
logs are implemented to provide monitoring over users’ activities, guidelines are 
defined on how to establish tests of the system prior to its acceptance, usage of antivirus 
and auditing tools will protect from malicious software, backup is defined in the 
information classification scheme, encryption will protect the information exchanged 
over the network as well as provide for email security. 
4.3.7 Access control 
 Access to information should be controlled to safeguard the information from 
malicious alterations or disclosure. 
 
The proposed security framework implements a number of access control mechanisms. 
Appropriate user profiles are defined on the database level, providing access to certain 
aspects of the information; a user is accessing only the information he has a need-to-
know. Each profile is associated with a certain job function i.e. nurse, social worker etc, 
that gives access to the necessary information that is needed for the user to do his/ her 
job. Furthermore, simple access control (username/ password) is implemented to 
provide access to non-critical data while advanced access control (digital certificates/ 
smart card/ biometrics) is defined based on the sensitivity level of the information. 
Furthermore, event logging is defined to detect deviation from access control policy and 
record events to provide evidence in case of security incidents. The framework should 
be upgraded to provide specific guidelines to ensure security when using mobile 
computing. A formal policy should be adopted that takes into account the risks of 
working with mobile equipment, in particular in unprotected environments. For 
example such a policy could include the requirements for physical protection, access 
controls, cryptographic techniques, back-ups and virus protection. Currently, DITIS 
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implements simple access control based on role separation and audit logs. Advanced 
access control using digital certificates is still under testing. 
   4.3.8 Systems development and maintenance 
The objective of this area is to ensure that security is build into information systems; 
this includes infrastructure and applications. The design and implementation of the 
business process supporting the application or service can be crucial for security. 
Security requirements should be identified and agreed prior to the development of the 
information system. Appropriate controls and audit trails or activity logs should be 
designed into application systems. These should include the validation of input data, 
internal processing and output data. Cryptographic systems and techniques should be 
used for the protection of information that is considered at risk and for which other 
controls do not provide adequate protection. 
 
As mentioned, the security framework makes use of the OCTAVE risk evaluation 
methodology to identify the security requirements that need to be addressed, as well 
users’ needs and requirements. History and logs cover the auditing aspect of the 
framework. Digital certificates could be used for advanced authentication and 
encryption. A Public Key Infrastructure is implemented at UCY [79] to ensure the 
accountability of users and maintain the integrity of the exchanged data. The PKI is still 
under testing. 
4.3.9 Business continuity management   
This section describes controls relating to business continuity and contingency planning, 
ranging from analysis and documentation through to regular exercising/testing of the 
plans. A business continuity management process should be implemented to reduce the 
disruption caused by disasters and security failures to an acceptable level through a 
combination of preventative and recovery controls. 
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The proposed framework addresses a fail safe plan in which it defines that the primary 
architecture should be replicated so if something happens the secondary infrastructure 
could take over. The fail safe plan is generic and should be refined to include more 
details as a guideline to develop a complete business continuity management process. 
4.3.10 Compliance 
The design, operation, use and management of information systems may be subject to 
statutory, regulatory and contractual security requirements. The organization must 
comply with applicable legislation such as copyright, data protection, protection of 
financial data, cryptography restrictions, rules of evidence etc.  
 
The confidentiality documents of the security framework adhere to European and 
national laws of data protection. Furthermore, a number of European directives were 
taken into consideration when designing the system such as the e-signatures directive.  
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4.4 Discussion 
The proposed security framework that guides DITIS security implementation features, 
addresses all the fundamental concepts analyzed in ISO/ IEC 17799 standard. Security 
objectives such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability are adequate 
addressed, covering the legal, human and technical aspects of the healthcare 
environment. The aim of the framework was to provide the necessary security 
mechanisms and procedures that are needed to safeguard the electronic healthcare 
environment, an objective that is fulfilled.  
 
However, it must be noted that the framework does not provide low level 
implementation details as this is not its purpose; rather it can be used as a guide to 
identify what it is needed on a high-level and the user can afterwards look for more 
details for the area he is interested. Nevertheless, the evaluation process identified areas 
that could be further analyzed in the security-level information classification scheme, 
and which are deemed vital in order to provide more details and guidance to the user; 
security management is essential to provide clear direction and visible management 
support for security initiatives, that is why it should define the required level of effort 
allocated under each classification; physical security should be further analyzed with 
specific measures to prevent unauthorized access and/ or damage to the organization’s 
assets; mobile control access should address issues such as physical protection, 
cryptographic techniques, backups;  and business continuity management should be 
designed in more detail, defining a combination of preventative and recovery controls to 
overcome disruption caused by disasters and security failures.  
 
In DITIS, a formal business continuity plan should be created, identifying the key-assets 
that must be replaced/ recovered when an incident occurs and the procedure that should 
be followed. Among others, it is important to define the response team, points of contact 
and the various procedures to recover medical records or replace affected devices. 
Scenarios should also be designed to aid the recovery planning. Response time is 
critical to ensure the availability of critical aspects of the system, thus response must 
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meet the requirements of a specified time frame in which the minimum application and 
application data must be available. 
 
Furthermore, the evaluation should include a comprehensive and balanced system of 
measurement which will be used to evaluate performance in information security 
management and feedback suggestions for improvement. Currently, the ISO/ IEC 17799 
does not address performance issues. However, it is vital to assess how implemented 
security measures affect the performance of the system in terms of latency, consumption 
of resources (i.e. battery consumption in case of mobile/wireless devices due to 
computational complexity), and number of successful security incidents that may affect 
the availability of the system. The aforementioned are performance metrics which affect 
the effectiveness and efficiency of any system, and most important affect user 
satisfaction since users require seamless response of the system, especially in the 
healthcare environment.  
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Chapter 5  
Conclusions 
5.1 Conclusions 
5.2 Future work 
5.1 Conclusions 
Electronic and mobile healthcare applications have revolutionized the healthcare sector, 
introducing new opportunities, better communication channels and an enhanced quality 
of care. At the same time, a number of considerations are raised regarding the protection 
of the most valuable assets processed through these applications; that is the medical 
records and healthcare transactions. Privacy, confidentiality, integrity, legal and ethical 
considerations are some of the security challenges that need to be addressed in the 
healthcare environment. 
 
This research study addressed security-related issues concerning electronic and mobile 
healthcare systems using DITIS, a telemedicine application. The outcome of the study is 
a healthcare security framework that includes all the appropriate security technologies 
and procedures that are needed to safeguard the data, people and infrastructure of the 
healthcare environment. The framework uses the OCTAVE risk evaluation 
methodology to identify the risks and areas of concern that address security challenges 
that should be taken into consideration when implementing security. The security 
technologies and procedures proposed in the framework are categorized based on the 
security objective they serve to help people identify the technology they need to 
implement based on what they want to protect. Finally, the framework defines a 
security-level information classification scheme that categorizes information based on 
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its sensitivity (public, internal-use only, confidential, highly confidential). The 
classification is then associated with the appropriate security technologies that should be 
considered under each classification level. Labeling information into sensitivity classes 
aims in helping us provide the appropriate protection by applying the necessary security 
measures for each situation.  The proposed scheme aims in balancing the trade-off 
between security complexity and performance by providing guidance on the minimum 
measures/ technologies that are needed to be implemented without complicating the 
operation of the system or saturating its performance with unnecessary functionality. 
 
The study and the results of this work, has led to the publication of 3 papers. The paper 
"Security Challenges in a mobile healthcare environment" has been presented in the 3rd 
International Workshop in Wireless Security Technologies (IWWST) that was organized 
in London, in 4
th
 of April 2005. The second paper, "E-healthcare Security Framework: 
DITIS Case Study”, was presented in the Tenth International Symposium on Health 
Information Management Research (iSHIMR2005) organized in Thessalonica, in 23
rd
 of 
September 2005. Finally, the third paper “Securing Mobile Healthcare Systems using 
Information Classification: DITIS Case Study” has been presented in the 4
th
 International 
Workshop on Security in Information Systems that was organized in Cyprus, in 23
rd
 of 
May 2006. 
 
Electronic healthcare is a sector that will keep evolving in parallel with technological 
advances. New challenges will arise and need to be addressed, and new approaches 
should be taken towards healthcare security. Existing solutions and procedures will need 
to be refined in the new healthcare conditions to keep providing the necessary protection 
over the information, people and infrastructure in question.  
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5.2 Future work 
Future work related with the current study involves extending the proposed security 
information classification scheme with more technical details. For example define 
appropriate cryptographic algorithms, how complex passwords should be, how strong 
physical security should be under each classification level etc. Decisions should be 
taken based on existing security standards to ensure interoperability with existing and 
future technology. 
 
Evaluation could be completed as soon as the actual system enters an operational state. 
A more technical evaluation will be applied using appropriate standards and guidelines 
such as the Common Criteria [80]; the Common Criteria supports the technical 
evaluation of IT security features in products. Then, the proposed security framework 
and the implemented security techniques and procedures in DITIS could be evaluated 
and result in more detailed findings that will identify the effectiveness of the security 
framework. The security framework will be refined based on the findings of the 
evaluation. 
 
Furthermore, the evaluation will assess how the proposed security measures affect the 
performance of the system. Performance is what often determines the successful 
adoption of a system. Healthcare applications need, among other things, to quickly 
respond to users’ requests. Wireless devices have a number of limitations that affects 
performance such as the battery depletion, hardware constrains – small amount of 
RAM, slow processors and usually no mass storage, and transient communication 
because of the mobility of the devices the network can experience a high rate of 
communication failures.  All these limitations must be taken into account when 
choosing security solutions in order to balance complexity with its effect on 
performance. 
 
Finally, usability is an area that needs more investigation within the security area. 
Usability is a concept that cannot be overlooked, especially since DITIS system is using 
wireless devices. Due to the limitations of the size of the wireless devices, all security 
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solutions implemented that require user input must take into consideration the user’s 
perspective and develop appropriate design for the interface. We do not want users to be 
resented because the interface is not the intended, and thus it is confusing and time-
consuming to use. Instead, the interface regarding the security techniques used, must 
offer a simple feel and look interface and navigation with minimum clicks that helps the 
user finish in a short time. Also, technical terminology should be avoided because it is 
often confusing for non-technical users. 
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Chapter 6 
Publications stemming from the thesis 
6.1 Publications 
6.1 Publications 
The outcome of this research study is documented in the following papers: 
 
1. Securing Mobile Healthcare Systems using Information Classification: DITIS Case 
Study, E. Stavrou, A. Pitsillides, 4
th
 International Workshop on Security in 
Information Systems, Cyprus, 23 May 2006. 
2. e-healthcare Security Framework: DITIS Case Study, E. Stavrou, A. Pitsillides, 
ISHIMR, 10th International Symposium for Health Information Management 
Research, Thessaloniki, Greece, 23 Sept 2005. 
3. Security Challenges in a Mobile Healthcare Environment, E. Stavrou, A. Pitsillides 
IWWST (International Workshop in Wireless Security Technologies) Westminster 
University, London, UK, 4 April 2005. 
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Appendix A: Security Policies 
 
 
Security policies are the cornerstone of any effective security strategy. They are used to 
complement and support the operation of a variety of security solutions. A well written 
security policy provides guidelines to employees as to how to maintain security of the 
organization’s data and systems. All employees must follow the suggested procedures 
otherwise they may face penalties based on the violation they commit.  
 
Based on DITIS profile, we have identified a number of security policies that are 
applicable to be implemented in DITIS environment. This section provides the general 
template of each security policy; the actual policies will be finalized when DITIS 
reaches an operational level. 
 
1. Password Policy 
 
Strong, secure passwords are the cornerstone of an effective security strategy. They are 
the front line of protection for user accounts. Passwords ensure that only authorized 
personnel will be able to gain access to a system or network.  A poorly chosen password 
may result in the compromise of the company's entire corporate network. As such, all 
employees are responsible for taking the appropriate steps, as outlined below, to select 
and secure their passwords. 
 
Passwords are used for various purposes at the corporation. Some of the more common 
uses include: user level accounts, web and email accounts, screen saver protection, etc. 
Everyone should be aware of how to select strong passwords in order to protect the 
systems and the information that reside at the company.  
 
• Passwords must contain at least eight nonblank characters.  
• Passwords must contain a combination of letters (preferably a mixture of upper 
and lowercase letters), numbers, and at least one special character within the first 
seven positions.  
  
• Passwords must contain a nonnumeric letter or symbol in the first and last 
positions.  
• Passwords must not contain the user login name.  
• Passwords must not include the user's own or close friend's or relative's name, 
employee number, Social Security number, birthdate, telephone number, or any 
information about him or her that the user believes could be readily learned or 
guessed.  
• Passwords must not include common words from an English dictionary or a 
dictionary of another language with which the user has familiarity.  
• Passwords must not contain commonly used proper names, including the name 
of any fictional character or place;  
• Passwords must not contain any simple pattern of letters or numbers such as 
"qwertyxx".   
• Passwords must be changed at least every 40 days. 
• Passwords must not be inserted into email messages or other forms of electronic 
communication. 
• Password should remain confidential and unique. 
• Do not use the same password for company’s accounts as for other non-
company’s access. 
• In the case of login failure, the user has three opportunities to provide the correct 
login and password. If he doesn’t, the account gets disable and he must contact 
the network administrator. 
 
 
2. Anti-virus policy 
 
All employees must follow recommended processes in order to prevent virus problems 
and protect the assets of the organization: 
 
• Always run the supported anti-virus software. Download and install anti-virus 
software updates as they become available. 
• Schedule the anti-virus to run daily at a time when there is no activity (i.e. over 
night) 
  
• Avoid direct opening or executing e-mail attachments. Always save the email 
attachment and scan for viruses before reading or executing them. 
• Always scan a floppy diskette from an unknown source for viruses before using 
it. 
• Back-up critical data and systems configurations on a regular basis and store the 
data in a safe place. 
• If an installation of a new program conflicts with anti-virus software, run the 
anti-virus utility to ensure a clean machine, disable the software, then run the 
program. After the installation, enable the anti-virus software. When the anti-
virus software is disabled, do not run any applications that could transfer a virus, 
e.g., email or file sharing. 
 
 
3. Encryption policy 
 
Encryption is the primary mean for providing confidentiality services for information 
sent over the Internet. Encryption can be used to protect any electronic traffic, such as 
mail messages or the contents of a file being downloaded. Encryption also can protect 
information in storage, such as in databases or stored on computer systems where 
physical security is difficult or impossible. 
 
Therefore, encryption must be used to protect any electronic traffic exchanged between 
the company and its customers. 
 
• Any remote connection to the organization’s network must be established 
through VPN channels. 
• If for any reason, an employee has to send confidential information via email, he 
must do so by configuring his email application to encrypt the message. 
• The organization must implement an appropriate encryption service and provide 
it to employees when they are using the healthcare application to send or retrieve 
confidential information. 
• Sensitive information that is locally stored on mobile devices must be encrypted. 
 
  
 
 
4. Audit policy 
 
Auditing is an important component for maintaining the organization’s security, since it 
can help investigate possible security incidents and ensure conformance to the 
organization’s security policies. An audit policy should balance between auditing 
enough events to be effective, but not so many events that the ones that really matter get 
lost. 
 
The auditing may include a variety of events. These events fall into several categories. It 
is up to the personnel who perform the audit to decide which events will be monitor. 
The following list includes such events: 
 
• Account Login - An event that's triggered when a domain controller receives a 
login request. You can audit an account login based upon successful logins or 
login failures.  
• Account Management - Pertains to any sort of maintenance to user accounts. 
For example, if a user creates, renames, or deletes a user account, an event can 
be logged.  
• Logon Events - Login Events refer to any time any user logs in or out of the 
system. In some situations, Login Events may also be triggered when a user 
connects to or disconnects from a computer on the network.  
• Object Access - Object Access tracks the way that users access physical objects 
such as files, folders, and printers.  
• Policy Change - Perhaps one of the most important types of event category. 
These events are triggered when someone makes a change to your security 
policies. These changes may include anything from changing user rights to 
changing audit policies.  
• Privilege Use - The Privilege Use category of events can be used to make an 
event log entry any time that someone uses one of the special rights you've 
assigned to them.  
  
• System Events - Events going on within the physical system. For example, you 
can log each time a server (or workstation) is shut down or restarted. A system 
event can also be triggered if the security log fills up. 
 
Some recommendations, concerning the management of audit trails, are given below: 
 
1. Protect the audit trail so that no normal user can view or modify the audit log. 
2. Do not allow multiple logons. If an employee is allowed to logon to his/her 
workstation and then walk around the corner and logon to another workstation 
with the same logon ID and password, the audit trail can no longer track the user 
as precisely as security needs require. If both terminals are active with the same 
logon, the system can never be sure if the authorized user is on the system or if 
someone else is using his/her account. 
3. Review audit logs for security-related incidents on a regular basis. 
4. Ensure that all users know that their systems and their actions are being 
monitored. 
5. Provide all users of the system with “security alert” announcements. 
 
 
5. Security incident handling policy 
 
An incident is defined as an event that has actual or potentially adverse effects on 
computer or network operations resulting in fraud, waste, or abuse; compromise of 
information; or loss or damage of property or information.  
 
Security incidents can, for example, be triggered by user errors which result in loss of 
data or alteration of sensitive system parameters, the appearance of security loopholes in 
hardware or software components, and exploitation of technical vulnerabilities, large-
scale infection by computer viruses, hacking of Internet servers, disclosure of 
confidential data, and many more. 
 
A security incident could cause significant loss or damage. To prevent or contain any 
loss or damage, security incidents should be dealt with swiftly and efficiently. If there is 
  
a predefined procedure available to be invoked, then reaction times can be minimized. 
The possible loss or damage which could occur in a security incident can affect both the 
confidentiality and integrity of data and also its availability. 
The purpose of this guideline is to ensure an efficient and effective response to 
computer security incidents. A poorly handled incident can result in wasted time, 
conflicting information and negative publicity. 
 
General 
 
Handling of security incidents should be aimed at ensuring the following: 
 
 The ability to respond so that security incidents and security problems are detected 
and reported to the appropriate responsible person(s) promptly. 
 The ability to decide whether it is a local security problem or constitutes a security 
incident. 
 The ability to take action so that in the event of a security incident the necessary 
measures can be taken and implemented at short notice 
 Minimization of damage (this is achieved through prompt notification of any other 
parts of the organization which could be affected), and 
 Effectiveness (this is achieved by practicing and monitoring the capability to handle 
security incidents) 
 
Notification and points of contact 
 
Each user of the corporation has a responsibility to report incidents that constitute a 
security incident or violation of the company’s policies. All security incidents will be 
reported to the appropriate office as soon as an incident comes to the attention of an 
employee or other person charged with responsibility for information resources within 
the company. An appropriate contact list must be defined and distributed within the 
organization so that people know who to contact in the case of an incident. The 
following template could be used to define the contact list: 
 
  
- Security incident team (if any) [a team composed of IT administrators, IT users, Public 
Relations Staff and possibly Management] 
<Names> <Telephone numbers> <Emails> or 
- System manager/administrator <His/her name> <Telephone number> <Email> 
- Technical manager <His/her name> <Telephone number> <Email> 
- System owner <His/her name> <Telephone number> <Email> 
- Legal counsel (if appropriate) <His/her name> <Telephone number> <Email> 
 
If for any reason the employee is unable to contact any of the above people and he 
believes that his computer has been broken into, he should physically unplug the 
computer from the network until a security engineer can look at it. However, it is 
important not to shut the computer down or kill any processes if at all possible since 
evidence may exist that is useful to identify what happened and also help prevent future 
attacks. 
 
Identifying an incident 
 
This stage involves determining if a problem really exists. To assist in identifying 
whether there really is an incident, it is usually helpful to obtain and use any detection 
software that may be available. In addition, there are certain indications or “symptoms” 
of an incident that deserve special attention: 
 
• System crashes 
• New user accounts, or high activity on a previously low usage account 
• Changes in file lengths or dates 
• Data modification or deletion 
• Denial of service 
• Unexplained, poor system performance 
• System anomalies 
• Suspicious browsing 
• Inability of a user to log in due to modifications of his/her account 
 
  
This list is comprehensive; it includes a number of common indicators. It is best to 
collaborate with other technical and computer security personnel to make a decision as a 
group about whether an incident is occurring. 
 
 
Key steps 
 
• Containment 
 
The purpose of containment is to limit the extent of an attack. An essential part of 
containment is decision making (e.g., determining whether to shut a system down, 
disconnect from a network, monitor system or network activity, set traps, disable 
functions such as remote file transfer, etc.). 
 
• Eradication 
 
Once the incident has been contained, it is time to eradicate the cause. But before 
eradicating the cause, great care should be taken to collect all necessary information 
about the compromised system(s) and the cause of the incident as they will likely be lost 
when cleaning up the system. Software may be available to help you in the eradication 
process, such as anti-virus software. 
 
• Recovery 
 
Once the cause of an incident has been eradicated, the recovery phase defines the next 
stage of action. The goal of recovery is to return the system to normal. If an incident 
turns out to be a successful break-in, then the system must be kept off the network until 
it has been evaluated by a security engineer and all corrective action has been taken. 
The following is a partial list of cleanup procedures that a security engineer may 
require: 
 
  
1. Re-installation of the operating system: If it's clear that a cracker gained full 
access to a system and could have modified the operating system, then the 
operating system will have to be re-installed from original (CD-ROM) media.  
2. Re-authentication of all users: If it's clear that one or more user accounts have 
been compromised, then all users on the system will have to be re-authenticated. 
This is done by first disabling all accounts and then requiring each user to 
contact the system administrator personally to re-enable their account and select 
a new password. 
3. Scanning the password file for "bad" passwords: Software is available to search 
for "bad" or easily guessed passwords. The security engineer may require that 
this software be run, then each account found to have a bad password will be re-
authenticated. 
4. Installation of security patches or software: The security engineer may require 
that additional security software be installed and/or that existing software be 
patched or updated. 
 
• Follow-up 
 
Once you believe that a system has been restored to a "safe" state, it is still possible that 
holes, and even traps, could be lurking in the system. One of the most important stages 
of responding to incidents is also the most often omitted, the follow-up stage. In the 
follow-up stage, the system should be monitored for items that may have been missed 
during the cleanup stage. 
 
• Aftermath-lessons learned 
 
In the wake of an incident, several actions should take place. These actions can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. An inventory should be taken of the systems' assets, (i.e., a careful 
examination should determine how the system was affected by the 
incident).  
2. The lessons learned as a result of the incident should be included in 
revised security plan to prevent the incident from re-occurring.  
  
3. A new risk analysis should be developed in light of the incident.  
4. An investigation and prosecution of the individuals who caused the            
incident should commence, if it is deemed desirable. 
 
 
6. Server security policy 
 
The purpose of this policy is to establish standards for the base configuration of internal 
server equipment that is owned and/or operated by the organization. Effective 
implementation of this policy will minimize unauthorized access to the organization’s 
proprietary information and technology.    
 
All internal servers deployed must be owned by an operational group that is responsible 
for system administration. Approved server configuration guides must be established 
and maintained by each operational group, based on business needs. Operational groups 
should monitor configuration compliance and implement an exception policy tailored to 
their environment.  
 
• Servers must be registered within the corporate enterprise management system. 
At a minimum, the  following information is required to positively identify the 
point of contact: 
o Server contact(s) and location, and a backup contact    
o Hardware and Operating System/Version    
o Main functions and applications, if applicable    
• Information in the corporate enterprise management system must be kept up-to-
date.    
• Configuration changes for production servers must follow the appropriate 
change management procedures.    
• Services and applications that will not be used must be disabled where 
practical.    
• Access to services should be logged and/or protected through access-control 
methods such as TCP  Wrappers, if possible.    
  
• The most recent security patches must be installed on the system as soon as 
practical, the only exception being when immediate application would interfere 
with business requirements.    
• Always use standard security principles of least required access to perform a 
function.    
• Do not use root when a non-privileged account will do.    
• If a methodology for secure channel connection is available (i.e., technically 
feasible), privileged access must be performed over secure channels, (e.g., 
encrypted network connections using SSH or IPSec).    
• Servers should be physically located in an access-controlled environment.    
• Servers are specifically prohibited from operating from uncontrolled work 
areas.    
  
Appendix B: Confidential Documents 
 
 
In order to comply with European and national legislation of Data Protection, 
appropriate documents were created and distributed among DITIS patients, medical 
professionals, administrative staff and software developers.   
 
The patients are informed about the need to process their medical information and give 
their written consent; medical professionals, administrative staff and software 
developers acknowledge their responsibility to protect the privacy of sensitive 
information and use it only to perform their assigned duties. 
 
Following, are the documents created to support the protection of information 
confidentiality according to the Data Protection Law guidelines. 
 
  
ΕΝΤΥΠΟ ΣΥΓΚΑΤΑΘΕΣΗΣ 
 
ΓΙΑ ΕΠΕΞΕΡΓΑΣΊΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΩΝ ΣΑΣ ∆Ε∆ΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΑΠΌ ΤΟΝ 
ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟ ΣΥΝ∆ΕΣΜΟ ΚΑΡΚΙΝΟΠΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΩΝ  
(ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ)   
 
Έχουµε νοµική υποχρέωση δυνάµει του Νόµου για την Επεξεργασία ∆εδοµένων 
Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα (Προστασία του Ατόµου) να διασφαλίζουµε ότι η φύλαξη και 
η επεξεργασία των προσωπικών σας δεδοµένων και όλων των άλλων πληροφοριών που 
σχετίζονται µε την υγεία σας, συµµορφώνονται µε τις προϋποθέσεις του Νόµου. 
 
Τέτοια προσωπικά δεδοµένα συµπεριλαµβάνουν πληροφορίες που έχουν δοθεί ή θα 
δοθούν στο µέλλον: 
 
• Από εσάς κατά την εγγραφή σας, κατά την εξέταση σας από τον ιατρό και 
γενικά κατά την περίθαλψη σας, 
• ή έχουν εξασφαλιστεί από τρίτους όπως π.χ. παραπεµπτική, αποτελέσµατα 
εξετάσεων ή εκθέσεις άλλων ιατρών. 
 
Αποδέκτες των πληροφοριών αυτών είναι όλοι οι εξουσιοδοτηµένοι και κατάλληλα 
εκπαιδευµένοι στο χειρισµό των πληροφοριών υπάλληλοι του ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ. 
 
Σύµφωνα µε το Νόµο, πληροφορίες που σχετίζονται µεταξύ άλλων, µε την υγεία ή την 
εθνική προέλευση, θεωρούνται Ευαίσθητα ∆εδοµένα. Οι πληροφορίες αυτές µπορούν 
να χρησιµοποιηθούν µόνο µε τη ρητή σας συγκατάθεση. 
 
  
 
 
ΕΧΕΜΥΘΕΙΑ 
 
 
Σύµφωνα και µε τις πρόνοιες του Νόµου όλες οι προσωπικές σας πληροφορίες θα 
τηρούνται απόρρητες και θα τυγχάνουν εµπιστευτικής µεταχείρισης. Οποιαδήποτε 
πληροφορία σας αφορά δε θα αποκαλύπτεται σε τρίτα πρόσωπα, εκτός στις περιπτώσεις 
που ο Νόµος το επιτρέπει. Οι περιπτώσεις αυτές είναι: 
 
• Όταν η αποκάλυψη γίνεται µε δική σας γραπτή συγκατάθεση, 
• Όταν η αποκάλυψη γίνεται διότι αυτό απαιτείται από το Νόµο ή δικαστικό 
διάταγµα, 
• Όταν η αποκάλυψη γίνεται στα πλαίσια δικαστικής διαδικασίας µεταξύ µας, 
• Όταν η αποκάλυψη γίνεται για σκοπούς τήρησης και λειτουργίας του Αρχείου 
Καρκίνου.  
 
 
 
ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑ ΤΩΝ ∆Ε∆ΟΜΕΝΩΝ 
 
 
Ο ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ. θα λαµβάνει κάθε αναγκαίο τεχνικό ή οργανωτικό µέτρο για την 
ασφάλεια των δεδοµένων και την προστασία τους από τυχαία ή αθέµιτη καταστροφή, 
τυχαία απώλεια, αλλοίωση, απαγορευµένη διάδοση ή πρόσβαση και κάθε άλλη αθέµιτη 
επεξεργασία.  
 
 
 
ΧΡΗΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΩΝ ΣΑΣ ∆Ε∆ΟΜΕΝΩΝ 
 
 
Θα φυλάττουµε και θα επεξεργαζόµαστε τα προσωπικά σας δεδοµένα σε φυσική µορφή 
ή στους ηλεκτρονικούς υπολογιστές του ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ. και θα τα χρησιµοποιούµε για 
τους ακόλουθους σκοπούς: 
 
• Παροχή των υπηρεσιών µας. 
• Έρευνα και στατιστική ανάλυση. Οι προσωπικές σας πληροφορίες είναι δυνατό 
να χρησιµοποιηθούν για να µελετήσουµε ατοµικές ανάγκες και τάσεις µε σκοπό 
να βελτιώσουµε τις υπηρεσίες που προσφέρουµε. 
  
 
 
∆ΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ ΠΡΟΣΒΑΣΗΣ ΣΤΑ ∆Ε∆ΟΜΕΝΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΟΎ 
ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΑ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΕΥΘΥΝΟΣ ΕΠΕΞΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΣ 
 
 
Η πιο πάνω πληροφόρηση για τους σκοπούς και τη χρήση των Προσωπικών σας 
∆εδοµένων καλύπτει τις υποχρεώσεις µας µε βάσει το Νόµο για την Επεξεργασία 
∆εδοµένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα (Προστασία του Ατόµου).  
 
Σύµφωνα µε τις πρόνοιες του Νόµου, έχετε δικαίωµα πρόσβασης στις λεπτοµέρειες που 
έχουµε καταγράψει για σας, έναντι πληρωµής του σχετικού δικαιώµατος και φυσικά 
έχετε δικαίωµα αντίρρησης και διόρθωσης τηρουµένων πάντοτε των σχετικών 
προνοιών του Νόµου.   
 
Ευελπιστούµε ότι η πληροφόρηση που περιέχεται στο έγγραφο αυτό θα σας είναι 
χρήσιµη. Αν έχετε οποιεσδήποτε ερωτήσεις ή ανησυχίες, µη διστάσετε να 
επικοινωνήσετε µε τον ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ. που είναι ο Υπεύθυνος Επεξεργασίας: 
 
ΠΑ.ΣΥ.ΚΑ.Φ.  
Φωτεινού Πανά 12-14 
Παλλουριώτισσα 
1045 Λευκωσία 
Τηλ: +357 (22) 345444 
Φαξ: +357 (22) 346116 
  
 
 
 
∆ΗΛΩΣΗ 
 
 
Με την υπογραφή σας στο έγγραφο αυτό βεβαιώνετε ότι: 
 
• Έχετε διαβάσει και ενηµερωθεί για το περιεχόµενο της δήλωσης αυτής και 
δίδετε ελεύθερα και µε πλήρη επίγνωση τη ρητή συγκατάθεση και αποδοχή σας 
για τη νόµιµη επεξεργασία των προσωπικών σας δεδοµένων 
συµπεριλαµβανοµένων των ευαίσθητων δεδοµένων για τους σκοπούς που 
περιγράφονται πιο πάνω. 
• Συµφωνείτε ότι το Αρχείο Καρκίνου θα έχει πρόσβαση και δικαίωµα 
επεξεργασίας των δεδοµένων που σας αφορούν. 
• Συµφωνείτε ότι ευαίσθητα δεδοµένα που έχουµε συλλέξει θα τύχουν 
επεξεργασίας για την υποστήριξη των υπηρεσιών µας. 
 
 
 
Υπογραφή: _____________________   Ηµεροµηνία: ________________ 
 
 
 
 
Μάρτυρας: _____________________ 
 
 
 
  
Code of Ethics for professionals handling confidential 
medical information for the Cyprus Association of 
Cancer Patients and Friends (PA.SY.KA.F.) 
 
 
I    ________________________________________________________________ 
 
of  ________________________________________________________________ 
 
hereby understand the significance and agree to protect any confidential information 
accessed on behalf of PA.SY.KA.F. while using DITIS (∆ΙΤΗΣ stands for “∆ίκτυο 
Ιατρικής Τηλεσυνεργασίας”, i.e. Network for Medical Collaboration) or other means, as 
required by the laws of the Cypriot Government and the European Community. I 
understand that any disclosure of confidential information is both unethical and illegal. 
 
Therefore, during my involvement with DITIS, I shall: 
 
1. Use the information provided only for the purpose of my job function and for a 
legitimate cause. 
2. Not reveal confidential information to unauthorized people who are not 
concerned with the subject. 
3. Be considered liable in the case where I am found compromising any sensitive 
information. 
 
 
Signed By: ___________________________________ 
 
Date: ________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Witnessed By:_________________________________ 
 
Witnessed By:_________________________________ 
 
  
 
 
